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Abstract 
This paper presents and interprets descriptive statistics generated from data obtained in a 
survey of clients of five micro finance organizations believed to be among the best in Bolivia. These 
lenders represent different combinations of organizational design, lending technology, and market 
area of operations. Two are regulated financial intermediaries and three are NGOs. Two operate 
in rural areas (PROD EM and Sartawi) and three operate in urban areas (Banco Sol, FIE, and Caja Los 
Andes). Two offer individual loans and three grant loans through joint liability groups. The paper 
discusses household-enterprise profiles of a sample of 622 clients and identifies terms and conditions 
of loan contracts with these organizations to evaluate the depth and quality of their outreach. 
The interpretation seeks to establish connections between key characteristics of the clients 
and features of the lending technologies that lead to the matching of classes of borrowers with 
particular organizations and that influence the choice of market niches. Data on loan sizes suggest 
the existence of different but broadly overlapping market niches associated with three tiers of clients. 
The sharpest distinction is between urban and rural clients. The matching between clients and 
organizations also reflects a weak but positive correlation between levels of poverty and loan sizes. 
According to an index ofbasic needs fulfillment of their clients, these organizations can be ranked 
as: FIE and Caja Los Andes (first tier), BancoSol (second tier), and PRODEM and Sartawi (third 
tier). The same ranking is obtained when clients are ordered according to loan size, the ratio of loan 
size to the value of sales, and the value of monthly sales. The three tiers of clients are associated 
with different socio-economic features of their household-enterprises: sex, education, household size, 
access to electricity, water supplies, and sewage facilities, employment-generating capacity of the 
enterprise, informality and separation of household and enterprise, occupations and the like. The 
development of lending technologies that do not rely on standard financial statements and 
collateralizable assets is a formidable innovation that explains the outreach and sustainability of 
these organizations. 
Differences in the guarantees required for loans dominate distinctions in lending technology. 
Trade-offs between loan size, interest rates, and guarantee requirements attract different subsets of 
the clientele. Joint liability seems to be appropriate for very poor people, but group borrowers 
eventually outgrow this relationship. Caja Los Andes and FIE have shown that it is possible to 
supply individual loans to poor people and be profitable. Most clients are satisfied with the services 
received. The lowest satisfaction concerns loan sizes and loan-size rationing may be widespread. 
At least in urban areas, increasing competition will force these organizations to improve their 
services and adjust loan sizes. All of these organizations are expanding the frontier of micro finance 
by developing lending technologies for a much poorer clientele than is reached by collateral-based 
lenders. This is a formidable achievement. 
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I. Introduction: Microfinance in Bolivia 
Over the past decade microfinance programs have made considerable progress in Bolivia. 
Indeed, several microfinance organizations have achieved substantial gains in the two key indicators 
of success in reaching the poor with financial services: outreach and sustainability (Yaron, 1994 ). 
At least 120,000 clients are being served by a growing number of these organizations, several of 
which are striving to cover their costs, minimize default losses, and become financially viable and 
institutionally self-sustainable. In recent years a few of these organizations have become formal, 
regulated financial intermediaries, and a few others seriously intend to follow this path of 
institutional transformation. This paper describes the profiles of a sample of clients drawn from five 
of these Bolivian micro finance organizations which have achieved comparative success in terms of 
outreach and sustainability. The main purpose ofthe paper is to illustrate the characteristics of their 
clients and the depth of outreach achieved by these five organizations. 
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This paper presents results based on data collected in a survey of clients offive microfinance 
organizations in Bolivia in November-December of 1995. Funding for the survey was 
provided by the Mission in Bolivia of the Agency for International Development, under 
purchase order No. AID 511-0000-0-00-6005. This paper is part of a series of studies of five 
Bolivian microfinance organizations undertaken by the Rural Finance Program at The Ohio 
State University. See footnote 3 for a list of sponsors of the broader research project. 
Gonzalez-Vega is Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics and Director of 
the Rural Finance Program, Meyer is Professor Emeritus of Agricultural Economics, and 
Navajas, Rodriguez-Meza, and Schreiner are Graduate Research Associates, all at The Ohio 
State University. Monje obtained his Ph.D. in Rural Sociology at Ohio State in 1995. The 
individuals and organizations that made possible this research project are too numerous to 
cite here, but the authors want to express their gratitude to Steve Smith, Kimberly A. Brown, 
and Gabriela Salazar de Santa Cruz at USAID/Bolivia, as well as Fernando Prado, Miguel 
Hoyos (FUNDAPRO), and numerous representatives of the five microfinance organizations 
studied, whose tireless collaboration made these efforts both fruitful and enjoyable. The 
authors are responsible for all errors of omission and interpretation. 
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This paper is part of a larger research project by the Rural Finance Program at The Ohio State 
University, namely Progress in lvficrojinance: Lessons from Bolivia.3 The goal of the broader 
project is to explore and compare key dimensions of the evolution of five microfinance organizations 
widely believed to be among the best in Bolivia. The purpose of the investigation is to derive 
lessons for other microfinance programs in Bolivia and in other developing countries. Emphasis is 
placed on identifying strengths and limitations of alternative lending and deposit mobilization tech-
nologies and on deriving implications of different organizational designs for outreach and self-sus-
tainability. 
Analysis of the progress of microtinance organizations in Bolivia is both challenging and 
attractive because of the success of several organizations despite their wide variety of institutional 
structures, lending technologies, and paths ofhistorical evolution. Moreover, because a few of these 
organizations have at least five years of experience, researchers can analyze key dimensions of their 
evolution over a reasonably long time period. 
The specific purpose of the survey of borrowers was to generate socio-economic profiles of 
the clients to help sketch the boundaries of the market niches of these organizations. Identifying 
their market niches will allow some assessment of the intensity of competition among these 
organizations and of the extent to which particular market niches may be approaching saturation. 
The analysis will also seek to establish a connection between key features of the clientele of each 
organization and the lending technologies used. 
This paper analyzes data from this survey of borrowers in an attempt to identify differences 
and similarities among the clienteles of the five micro finance organizations and to determine the 
extent to which the market niches actually served by these organizations are differentiated or over-
lap. The paper also explores differences in the terms and conditions of the clients' loan contracts 
with these organizations and any changes in the clients' sources of credit associated with their access 
to the services of these organizations. 
The survey covered not only the current loan and household-enterprise situation of borrowers 
who had loans outstanding at the time of the survey, but also all loans received by these borrowers 
throughout their entire history with the microfinance organization where they were a client at the 
time of the survey. These data facilitate an understanding of the evolution of the terms and 
conditions, especially loan sizes, interest rates, and terms to maturity, of the loan contracts with the 
Financial assistance for the broader project was received from Interdizciplinare Projekt 
Consult (IPC) in Frankfurt, Germany, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the United States Agency for International Development, both the 
USAID Mission in La Paz and the Cooperative Agreement on Financial Resources 
Management (FIRM), and the Department of Agricultural Economics at The Ohio State 
University. The authors gratefully acknowledge this support but assume full responsibility 
for the results of the project. 
3 
microfinance organization. In addition, these data provide comparative insights about the quality 
of the outreach of each organization as perceived by the clients. Information was also obtained about 
other sources of credit at the time of the first contact with the micro finance organization and about 
financial transactions with other intermediaries in the present. These data will allow some 
discussion of how well the micro finance organizations are responding to the clients' demands for 
financial services. 
The profiles ofthe clientele are an interesting dimension of the study especially because they 
are proxies for the depth of outreach of these organizations. Outreach results from the provision of 
a wide array of financial services to large numbers of the poor. Breadth of outreach refers to the 
number of clients from the target group being served. Depth of outreach refers to success in 
overcoming difficulties in reaching marginal target groups with financial services. Depth of 
outreach is usually proxied by the level of poverty ofthe borrowers: the poorer the client, the greater 
the depth of outreach. Quality of outreach refers to the variety of services supplied at low transaction 
costs to the clients (Christen eta!., 1995). Several important and at times surprising results about 
outreach are revealed by the analysis of the data presented in this paper. 
H. Five Microfinance Organizations 
Five comparatively successful microfinance organizations were selected for study. The 
different organizational types and lending technologies of these five microfinance organizations are 
outlined below: 
(a) BancoSoi (Banco Solidario, S.A.), a quasi-private commercial bank. 
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This financial intermediary implements a group-lending technology largely in an urban 
setting. Because it serves more clients (currently over 60,000) than any other micro lender, 
Banco Sol has the broadest outreach of any microfinance organization in Latin America. In 
addition, it has achieved full independence from subsidies.4 Just like any other Bolivian 
bank, BancoSol operates under the prudential supervision of the Superintendency of Banks 
and Financial Institutions (Rock, 1996). Although it is a regulated commercial bank, its 
portfolio is mostly composed of very small loans granted on the basis of joint liability 
offered by members of borrowing groups of poor people. In implementing its lending 
technology Banco Sol has been able to keep the level of arrears at outstandingly low levels 
and to generate profits. These profits have been reinvested in broadening the organization's 
outreach even further. 
Although BancoSol is fully chartered as a private commercial bank, its owners include a 
local non-government organization (PRODEM) and several international organizations: 
Gonzalez-Vega et. al. ( 1996) present a detailed discussion of the challenges resulting from 
the rapid growth and the gradual achievement of subsidy independence ofBancoSol. 
4 
ACCION International, Calmeadow Foundation, Societe D'Investissement et Development 
International, and the Rockefeller Foundation, as weH as the Inter-American Investment 
Corporation, affiliated with the Inter-American Development Bank. These non-private 
shareholders own 75 percent of the stock, while the rest is held by private Bolivian 
businesses and individual businessmen. 
(b) PRODEM (Fundaci6n para la Promoci6n y Desarrollo de la Microempresa), a non-
government microfinance organization. 
The successful operations of this non-government organization (NGO) during 1987-1991 
eventually led to the creation of BancoSol in early 1992 and to the sale of PRODEM's 
outstanding urban branches to BancoSol. Although PROD EM is BancoSol's most important 
shareholder and maintains a complex symbiotic relationship with this bank, as an indepen-
dent organization PRODEM now implements a group-lending technology with a focus on 
expansion into rural areas. In its earlier days PRODEM made the key technological con-
tributions that later on gave BancoSol a head start in its successful operation in urban areas. 
The challenge for PRODEM today is how to achieve the technological innovation needed 
for successful replication or adaptation of its lending methodology to a rural clientele. This 
is an even more difficult task. 
(c) Caja Los Andes (Caja de Ahorro y Prestamo Los Andes, S.A.), a quasi-private regulated, 
non-bank financial intermediary. 
This financial intermediary resulted from the formalization and upgrading of a successful 
non-government microfinance organization: PROCREDITO. Although chartered as a 
private financial intermediary (jondo financiero privado ), the owners of Caja Los Andes are 
a local NGO (PROCREDITO) and several international organizations, namely the Corpora-
cion Andina de Fomento, with funds provided by the German Government (GTZ), the Swiss 
Technical Cooperation (COTESU), and the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as 
a few Bolivian individuals as minority owners but with funds provided by PROCREDITO 
to be invested on its behalf. In contrast to PROD EM, which continued to provide financial 
services after investing in the creation of BancoSol, PROCREDITO ceased independent 
financial operations and for all practical purposes metamorphosed itself into Caja Los Andes. 
Chartered as a non-bank regulated intermediary, Caja Los Andes has implemented an 
individual-client lending technology in an urban setting. With this methodology it has been 
able to keep arrears at outstandingly low levels and to generate profits. In late 1995, Caja 
Los Andes began to expand its individual loan operations into rural areas by adapting a 
lending technology developed by Financiera CALPIA in El Salvador (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1996a). Moreover, a few months after the survey, Caja Los Andes followed BancoSol to 
become the only other Bolivian microfinance organization that formally offers voluntary 
deposit services to its clientele. Caja Los Andes also operates a successful gold pawnshop 
window. 
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(d) FIE (Centro de Fomento a Iniciativas Econ6micas), a non-government microfinance 
organization. 
FIE is another NGO that successfully implements an individual-client lending technology 
in an urban setting. Both FIE and Caja Los Andes are ideologically committed to an 
individual-client lending technology, and both have a successful record of implementing it.5 
Beyond the perception that individual transactions may be more convenient and in other 
ways welfare-improving for clients, these organizations have shown that making individual 
loans to the target population can be profitable, as argued by Schmidt and Zeitinger ( 1994 ). 
Created by concerned citizens without little external help, FIE recently expanded from its 
original focus oflending almost exclusively for ''production" (manufacturing activities) into 
lending also for trading. This organization also separated its training services from its 
financial operations, which include leasing in addition to regular microlending. This 
microfinance organization is considering transforming itself into a regulated non-bank 
financial intermediary (fonda financiero privado) and has started negotiations with the 
Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions to this effect. 
(e) Fundaci6n Sartawi, a non-government micro finance organization. 
This microfinance organization, affiliated with the Lutheran Church of Bolivia, operates 
entirely in rural areas and it offers mostly group loans to people in distant communities. 
Sartawi is an Aymara word that means moving ahead, progressing (levantarse, ir hacia 
adelante). This NGO has been actively seeking to strengthen its organizational design to 
achieve long-term viability and has recently considered merging with a larger organization 
(Agrocapital), in order to jointly seek a charter as afondo financiero privado. 
In recent years the Bolivian authorities have otiered several opportunities for microfinance 
organizations to become formal, regulated intermediaries (Trigo, 1996). One instance of this 
positive attitude was the granting of a commercial bank charter to BancoSol, despite the non-
traditional composition of its portfolio, characterized by the absence of real collateral. Another 
instance of this attitude was the introduction of non-bank charters specifically designed to promote 
the formalization ofmicrofinance organizations. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Caja Los 
Andes was created as the first private financial fund (jondo jinanciero privado ). FIE has taken 
concrete steps to request a charter as a fonda financiero privado as well. This charter places the 
intermediary under the jurisdiction of the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions and 
5 During an interview, Pilar Ramirez, one of the founders of FIE, expressed the view that "if 
wealthier borrowers are not required to form groups in order to gain access to loans, why 
should the poor be forced into it?" To the extent that these two organizations have been able 
to show that individual loans can be profitably supplied to poor people, this is an important 
question. Unfortunately, this issue cannot be discussed further here. 
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allows it to mobilize deposits, w1th the exception of checking accounts. The charter does not 
authorize the institution to engage in international transactions or in credit card operations and it 
restricts the size of any loan to no more than 3 percent of its equity. The minimum capital required 
is smaller than mandated for banks. 
External inputs have been important in the development of these microfinance organizations. 
PRODEM and BancoSol have maintained a close affiliation with the international networks of 
ACCION International and Calmeadow Foundation and have benefitted from significant support 
from USAID. BancoSol is the only one among the five, however, that is now totally independent 
of subsidies. Caja Los Andes has received support mostly from the Gern1an Government (GTZ) via 
technical assistance by the consulting firm IPC. It has also benefitted from subsidized liabilities and 
equity contributions. 
While FIE has not had similar affiliations, thus making progress without substantial external 
technical assistance, about half of its liabilities are subsidized funds from various donors. All of 
FIE's equity consists of donated funds or retained earnings. In recent years, however, about half of 
its liabilities have been loans from public institutions and from private individuals at market rates 
of interest. In turn, the main supporters of Sartawi have been the Lutheran Church of Bolivia and 
Plan Intemacional. Recently, all of these organizations except Caja Los Andes have received various 
forms oftechnical support from USAID. 
All five of these microtinance organizations show strong elements of success. Their outreach 
and actual or potential self-sustainability are significant compared to other programs in Bolivia and 
to many microfinance organizations in other developing countries. They have, nevertheless, 
strengths and weaknesses in different areas and for different reasons. Among them, BancoSol and 
Caja Los Andes have stronger organizational structures for the implementation of cost-etiective 
financial intermediation technologies that offer both loans and deposit facilities. These two 
organizations appear poised to sustain significant levels of outreach and self-sustainability.6 
Different degrees of support, mostly in the form of technical assistance, could bring the other three 
organizations to the same level of performance as the two leaders. All have the potential to become 
models of success for microfinance programs in Bolivia and other developing countries. 
III. Objectives and Methods 
To understand key determinants of observed differences in outreach and sustainability across 
these five microfinance organizations better, it is critical to analyze the socio-economic and financial 
profiles of their clienteles. The nature of the financial services demanded and the costs of providing 
6 Given the outstanding accomplishments of these organizations, an intriguing comparative 
analysis can be attempted about the use of group-loan and individual-lending technologies. 
Gonzalez-Vega eta!. (1996) provides an in-depth analysis of Banco Sol and Gonzalez-Vega 
eta!. (1997) is a comparative analysis of the five organizations. 
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these services are strongly influenced by circumstances of the clienteles and by the evolution of their 
loan contracts with the organizations. The depth of outreach of these Bolivian microfinance 
organizations cannot be judged fully without some understanding of the target market, the range and 
quality of the financial services offered to the clientele, and the nature of the financial options 
available to these clients. These topics are explored here by analyzing data from a survey of clients. 
The survey of clients was designed to explore key characteristics of the borrowers and their 
financial transactions. For this purpose. independently drawn random samples of clients were 
obtained for each organization studied. Because of budget constraints, the survey considered only 
clients in La Paz and El Alto for those organizations with urban operations (BancoSol, Caja Los 
Andes, and FIE) and only clients in the Altzplano around Lake Titikaka, near La Paz, for those 
organizations with rural operations (PRODEM and Sartawi).7 Thus, clients of the growing network 
of branches of some of these organizations in other parts of the country were not included in the 
survey and the results presented here are thereby not representative of their entire portfolio. 
The population to be surveyed consisted of all clients in the areas under study with active 
loans as of September, 1995. This choice excluded past clients who did not have active loans at the 
time of the survey. While this choice was justified by budget constraints, some questions (such as 
reasons for leaving a program) cannot be examined. Some results from the data may also be subject 
to self-selection bias because only those clients who had been sufficiently satisfied with the services 
received were still in the active portfolio. Also, clients who were not successful in their business 
ventures may have dropped out because of a lack of opportunities to generate income and repay 
loans. Since the probability of failure may be correlated to some of the socio-economic features 
investigated here, a bias may be introduced in the results. 
The five microfinance organizations provided lists of clients meeting the criteria for the 
survey and totaling 52,189 names. The target was to obtain 500-600 valid interviews, equivalent 
to about 1 percent of the relevant population. Although this representation was maintained overall 
(1.2 percent), the sampling procedure resulted in a sample as high as 3.0 percent of the borrowers 
from a particular organization (PROD EM) and as low as 0.8 percent of the borrowers of another 
organization (BancoSol) being selected for interviewing. This was the case because the proportion 
of the population of borrowers from a given organization to be included in the sample was adjusted 
to obtain a sufficient number of observations to make reliable inferences about each organization. 
That is, the overriding consideration was not the proportion of the total population sampled, but 
rather obtaining enough interviews for each organization to reduce sampling errors. 
The sample was drawn according to the size of each branch. Table 1 shows the number of 
branches considered and of borrowers sampled by organization in La Paz, El Alto, and the Altiplano. 
Table 1 also shows the number of borrowers selected in the original sample as well as the number 
7 The clients of the Alto Lima branch of Banco Sol in El Alto were not considered because 
administrative changes underway in the branch made it impossible to collect data there. 
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of interviews successfully completed by location. The sample included 20 percent additional names 
selected for use as replacements if the borrowers in the original sample were not found. 8 The 
efficiency of the field work was 92.4 percent and it generated a total of 622 observations.9 
Once the potential interviewees were identified, the loan officer associated with each client 
completed a questionnaire concerning the client's credit history with the organization. A total of 694 
loan officer questionnaires were completed. A second questionnaire was then administered to the 
borrowers. Table 2 shows the number of clients interviewed per organization as well as the number 
of loan officer questionnaires (72) not matched by a borrower interview. This situation arose for a 
number of reasons, such as for example when clients could not be located for an interview in spite 
of several visits to their home or worksite. The majority of the interviewing was conducted during 
November and December of 1995, with a few interviews completed during January, 1996. 10 
Although access to certain locations was difficult, special efforts were made to reach the borrowers 
selected and, in general, once the respondents were located and their initial resistance was overcome, 
they collaborated thoughtfully. The borrower interview lasted about one hour, in addition to the time 
consumed by interruptions when the borrowers attended to their customers. 
The authors believe that the data obtained from these instruments are highly reliable. First, 
field workers made repeated efforts to locate the borrowers, often visiting their place of work or 
home several times before giving up and replacing the borrower w1th another client from the 
substitute list. This effort reduced sample-selection error. Second, the questionnaire was redesigned 
after a pre-test, incorporating both the suggestions of officers of the microfinance organizations and 
the experiences of researchers in the field. Third, the loan-officer questionnaires were completed 
by the loan officers themselves with the use ofthe organization's loan dossiers for each client. Thus, 
8 
9 
10 
The sample selection was made using a random number generator. Given the remoteness of 
the localities and dispersion of its clientele, before the random selection was made for 
Sartawi the list of borrowers was broken down into subsets of clients according to the date 
the borrowers were scheduled to visit local towns and make payments. These dates were set 
by Sartawi to coincide with local market fairs. Given repeat visits by the interviewers during 
a month, all the borrowers in the list had the same probability of being selected. 
Due to missing values or when the concept is not applicable to a particular household, the 
statistics reported here may result from less than 622 observations. 
Guillermo F. Monje directed the field work. Franz Hochtatter and Enrique Aguilar super-
vised 12 interviewers divided into two teams. Interviewers were selected because they had 
substantial experience in survey work and several spoke Spanish and Quechua. The inter-
viewers were: Luis Fernando Castafieda, Willy Castro, Concepcion Choquetarqui, Isidora 
Coria, Maria Luisa Cuentas, Marisol Guzman, Celia Kantuta, Palmira Maldonado, Ruth 
Marin, Edwin Pocori, Veronica Quispe, and Maria Sanchez. Daniel Navajas assisted in the 
selection of the sample and was also in charge of the construction of the electronic data base. 
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the loan history data were corroborated by both the loan officer and the organization's written 
records. Because these data refer to the entire length of the organization-client relationship, they 
provide an insightful picture of the evolution of loan terms and conditions, especially loan size, for 
each client. Fourth, the supervisors reviewed all questionnaires carefully, sending several with 
suspicious data back for repeat interviews. Fifth, errors of data entry were meticulously tracked 
down. Sixth, the interviewers, aware that borrowers may be sensitive to questions about loans and 
finances, consciously tried to create an atmosphere oftrust early in the interview when non-sensitive 
questions about household demographics were asked before moving on to more sensitive topics. 
IV. Client Characteristics 
The basic demographic features of their clients do not differ much across the five organiza-
tions. This implies that these lenders serve comparatively similar although somewhat differentiated 
market niches, as will be shown under the discussion of loan sizes. The greatest distinctions emerge 
along the rural/urban dimension of the household-enterprises of the clients. This important 
distinction suggests that different criteria may be necessary in assessing the cost functions and other 
dimensions of the lending technologies of urban versus rural programs and that these differences 
should be kept in mind during the rest of the analysis. The basic characteristics of the clients and of 
their enterprises are presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5 and are discussed below. 
Age 
In urban areas the average age of a client is 38 years (Table 3, item 1). In rural areas 
PRODEM serves younger clients (35 years old on average), and Sartawi reaches older clients (43 
years old on average). Almost two-fifths of the clients in urban areas are between 35 and 45 years 
old (Table 3, item 2). 11 More than one-half of PRODEM clients are younger than 35 years and 
almost one-half of Sartawi clients are older than 45 years. Except for Sartawi, at most one quarter 
of the clients of these organizations are 45 years or older. 
Given the average age of their borrowers, these microfinance organizations and their clients 
can look forward to the development of client-organization relationships that may last for decades. 
This long-term horizon represents a strong incentive for the borrowers to protect their reputations 
with good repayment records and for the organizations to maintain both a high quality of services 
and a strong image of permanency in order to enhance the value of this relationship for the 
borrowers. In general, organizations with better services and a stronger image of viability appear 
to benefit from lower arrears and losses from default, ceteris paribus (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
11 Given the evolution of the demand for financial services over the life cycle of the household-
enterprise, producers at an economically active age will predominate in the portfolio. 
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Sex 
The highest concentration of women clients in the portfolio is observed at BancoSol (78 
percent), followed by Caja Los Andes (62 percent). As shown in Table 3 (item 3 ), among the urban 
organizations this proportion is lowest at FIE ( 44 percent). The rural organizations show even lower 
concentrations of women in the portfolio. This might be expected given that men control most 
(cash) agricultural activities. Women are 32 percent of the clients ofPRODEM and 27 percent of 
the clients of Sartawi. 
None of the five organizations specifically targets loans to women. Therefore, rather than 
representing explicit gender policies, the distribution of their portfolios according to sex reflects 
features of the clienteles attracted to each program. These features ret1ect the market areas where 
the organizations operate and the comparative advantages of these organizations in serving certain 
types of clients. These advantages result, in tum, from specific features of their lending technolo-
gies. When schedules of frequent loan repayment, such as weekly payments, are required for the 
monitoring of borrowers according to these lending technologies, traders can generate the cash flow 
turnover needed for frequent payments more easily than other types of producers. Women, in tum, 
predominate in trading activities in urban Bolivia. 12 For these reasons, women will also predominate 
in the portfolios of micro finance organizations. 
Household size 
Household size was defined as the number of people who live together. The households of 
micro finance clients tend to be large. About three-quarters of the households have five or more 
members, including the client. In urban areas, the proportion of households with five or more 
members ranges from a low of 68 percent for FIE to a high of78 percent for BancoSol clients (Table 
3, item 9). Rural households tend to be a bit larger. The proportion of households with five 
members or more is 76 percent for PRODEM and 79 percent for Sartawi. 
Large households allow for a diversity of occupations among family members and result in 
complex demands for financial services. A diversity of occupations increases creditworthiness by 
allowing different sources of cash flows for repayment and by permitting activity diversification for 
risk reduction. In addition to a complex financial management, the fungibility of funds within the 
household-enterprise makes it very difficult to attribute impacts to any individual loan or household 
activity. These difficulties make studies of credit impact costly to implement. 
12 In some cases, women can attend group meetings more easily than men and may enjoy 
externalities from participating in these meetings. 
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Household composition 
Men are normally considered to be heads of household in Bolivia. Because a higher propor-
tion ofBancoSol borrowers are women, a lower proportion of its borrovvers are heads of household 
an1ong the clients of these organizations. Only 42 percent ofBancoSol clients consider themselves 
as heads ofhousehold (Table 3, item 4). This proportion is higher for Caja Los Andes (52 percent) 
and highest for FIE (72 percent), the organization with the lowest participation of women among 
those operating in urban areas. The even higher proportion of clients who are heads of household 
in rural areas is correlated with the higher proportion of male borrowers in PRO OEM and Sartawi. 
In fact, a ranking of the organizations by the proportion of borrowers who are heads of household 
is exactly the reverse of a ranking by the proportion of borrowers who are women. 
The connection between gender and being head of household is confirmed by the specific 
data on women clients. The proportion of women clients who are heads of household is generally 
low. It is higher for BancoSol (26 percent), however, but even this proportion is much lower than 
for the clientele (women and men) at large (Table 3, item 4). The proportion of women who are 
heads of household is only 18 percent for clients of FIE and Caja Los Andes and much lower in rural 
areas. That a higher proportion of BancoSol women clients are heads of household may imply 
greater vulnerability, because th1s suggests a single-parent household or perhaps a client who is a 
widow. These households tend to be poorer and to have less stable sources of income and may not 
be able to borrow from other (non-group) micro finance organizations. 
Household labor supply 
The survey results reflect the typical composition of poor households in La Paz and El Alto. 
In a high proportion ofthese households at least three household members work, usually in different 
occupations in order to address risks through activity diversification. The proportion of households 
with at least three workers ranges from a low of 71 percent for FIE clients (despite a greater 
proportion of manufacturing producers) to a high of84 percent for clients ofCaja Los Andes (Table 
3, item 10). A similarly high proportion of households with at least three working members is 
observed in rural areas, where income diversification activities are also important as a strategy for 
managing risk, and where this proportion is highest for Sartawi clients (81 percent). 
In many urban households, the typical arrangement is for men to be engaged in manu-
facturing or in seasonal construction and for women to be involved in trading. Although women 
frequently market the output of their husband's manufacturing activity, they also diversify their 
sources of income by marketing other domestic and foreign products (Table 5, item 6). Access to 
loans and to deposit facilities thus assists in the liquidity and risk management of the whole 
household. 
For some purposes, knowing the borrower's sex may be important, but it is incorrect to 
assume that the client is the only beneficiary of the loans or the only decision-maker in the 
household whose choices are influenced by access to credit from the microfinance organization. 
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This is particularly true when there is no separation of accounts nor of flows of funds between the 
client's household and business, as shown in Table 5 (item 7). Receiving a loan represents an 
increase in the whole household's command over resources and because of the fungibility of funds 
the impact of the loan cannot be identified without understanding the overall household choices with 
the loan (actual) and Without the loan (counterfactual). 
Education 
Interesting distinctions among clients also emerge with respect to levels of education. 
Among the three urban programs, BancoSol clients are less well educated: 8 percent have no 
schooling at all, compared to 6 percent for clients of Caja Los Andes and 1 percent for FIE clients 
(Table 3, item 5). Moreover, another 25 percent of BancoSol clients have completed at most the 
third grade compared to 13 percent for clients of Caja Los Andes and only 9 percent for FIE clients. 
At the upper end of the distribution, 16 percent of FIE clients and 11 percent of the clients of C<Da 
Los Andes have more than a secondary education, compared to only 3 percent for BancoSol clients. 
Women are less educated in general in Bolivia and differences in client education are 
correlated with the concentration of women in BancoSol's portfolio. These differences may also 
reflect greater poverty among the clientele of this organization (Navajas et al., 1996). They may also 
be associated with the greater presence of FIE clients in manufacturing. Lower levels of education 
tend to characterize the jobs in petty trading in which women predominate. The lower levels of 
education of women are shown in Table 3 (items 7 and 8). In the case of BancoSol clients, 39 
percent of the women but only 17 percent of the men reached the third grade at most. These 
proportions are 25 percent (women) and 10 percent (men) for clients of Caja Los Andes and 17 
percent (women) and 4 percent (men) for FIE clients. The proportions of men with the highest levels 
of education are higher than for women in all cases. 
Even lower levels of education characterize rural areas in Bolivia. As expected, therefore, 
the clients of these micro finance organizations are less well educated in the rural areas than in the 
urban areas. Among PRODEM and Sartawi clients, 14 percent have no schooling at all and another 
19-20 percent did not reach beyond the third grade (Table 3, item 5). It is interesting to note, 
however, that Banco Sol clients are almost as poorly educated as the clients of these rural organiza-
tions. The disadvantages of women are particularly pronounced in rural areas. For PRODEM 
clients, 63 percent of the women but only 20 percent of the men reached the third grade at most. 
These proportions are 61 percent (women) and 23 percent (men) for Sartawi clients (Table 3, items 
7 and 8). The proportions ofbetter-educated men are considerably higher than for women. 
Principal occupation 
The concentration of clients in the portfolio of a microfinance organization who are women 
and are poorly educated is highly associated with the concentration ofloans for trade. Trading is the 
main occupation for 63 percent ofBancoSol clients, 49 percent of borrowers of Caja Los Andes, and 
13 
only 33 percent of FIE customers (Table 5, item 1). 13 PRODEM has a tradition of lending to 
borrowers with trading activities, so the proportion of its clients whose main occupation is commerce 
is 50 percent, while this proportion is only 28 percent for Sartawi clients. Sartawi, in turn, has a 
tradition of lending for agricultural activities, especially cattle fattening and cattle trading. 
The concentration of BancoSol's portfolio in women, rather than being the outcome of 
specific targeting policies, is thus a reflection of the predominance of Bolivian women in urban 
trading. BancoSol's lending technology of making short-term loans with frequent payments requires 
a quick turnover of borrower cash flows that leads to this concentration in trade loans. Frequent 
payments are used by the organization to facilitate the careful monitoring of borrowers (Gonzalez-
Vega eta!., 1996). 
At the other extreme, the concentration of FIE's portfolio in loans to clients whose main 
occupation is manufacturing ( 49 percent) leads to a lower proportion of women clients and to a 
higher proportion of heads of household among its clientele. These patterns are replicated in rural 
areas, where the greater concentration of borrowers in agriculture at Sartawi (53 percent) leads to 
a predominance of male, head-of-household borrowers among its clientele. 
Trading is the main occupation of women who are clients of all five in these organizations. 
The proportion of women clients whose main occupation is trade ranges from 57 percent for FIE and 
Sartawi to 72 percent for BancoSol (Table 5, item 2). In contrast, production (either manufacturing 
or agriculture) is the main occupation of men. The proportion of men engaged in production ranges 
from 38 percent for Banco Sol to 68 percent for FIE clients. PROD EM ( 46 percent) and Banco Sol 
(32 percent) are the only two organizations with high proportions of male clients in trade as well 
(Table 5, item 3). These results suggest that it may be easier to form borrowing groups among 
people engaged in trading rather than manufacturing or agriculture. In addition to patterns of cash 
flows that allow regular contributions, one explanation may be that traders are often located close 
to each other, while other activities may be more dispersed. Proximity reduces the transaction costs 
of participation in ROSCAs. 
13 The concentration of loans for trade in the portfolio of these micro finance organizations has 
been ideologically troubling for those who criticize trading as not being a productive activity. 
This criticism ignores not only the complexity and interrelations of the household economy 
but at least two other considerations. First, trade is indeed productive because providing 
information, transportation, and transaction opportunities in La Paz adds value to domestic 
and foreign goods produced far from the city. Second, many women market the output of 
their husbands, thereby adding value to their joint enterprise. A policy to reduce the share 
of loans for trade would also reduce the share of loans disbursed to women. If the gender of 
the borrower matters, this policy to not favor trading would also hurt women. 
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PY/ ultiple occupations 
Between one-half and two-thirds of the urban clients and over three-quarters of the rural 
clients of these organizations have more than one occupation (Table 5, item 4). Multiple occupations 
may be the result of efforts to diversify sources of income in a risky environment. Banco Sol clients 
engaged in petty trade are least likely to have a secondary occupation. In contrast, manufacturing 
producers and farmers show a greater inclination to have multiple sources of income. 
Trade is the most important secondary activity for the clients in all five microfinance 
organizations (Table 5, item 5). The data suggest that, with the exception of Sartawi clients, between 
80 and 90 percent of the clients of these organizations engage in trading as a primary or as a 
secondary occupation. This reflects an inclination of microentrepreneurs to market their own 
products. Trade also appears to be highly remunerative given the Bolivian environment and other 
opportunities available, especially to women. Both in the urban informal sector and in the rural 
areas, trade represents an integral part of the economic activities of the household. In rural areas, 
active trading in livestock is a major strategy for the management of liquidity and the accumulation 
of reserves for precautionary purposes. Trading activities are particularly compatible, in tum, with 
the nature of the lending technologies ofthese organizations. 
Except for BancoSol clients, most traders market their own production. This proportion is 
highest for FIE (68 percent), which is consistent with the larger proportion of manufacturing clients 
served by this organization (Table 5, item 6). Trading own products is also significant in rural areas, 
especially for Sartawi clients, among whom 74 percent market their own output. For this reason, 
Sartawi and PROD EM schedule loan repayments to coincide with regional trading fairs where their 
clients generate cash through sales of their products. The importance of these cash t1ows from 
trading suggests that there may be a strong untapped demand for deposit services in these rural areas. 
Among those borrowers with trading activities, the proportion who market domestically-
produced goods is high compared to those who market imported goods (Table 5, item 6). 14 Thus, 
trader-borrowers market mostly the output of their own household production, followed by the 
marketing of other goods produced in Bolivia, and some foreign goods. Casual observation of street 
vendors reveals a wide variety of merchandising patterns. Some vendors specialize in domestic 
products (e.g., fruits and vegetables), others in imported products (e.g., cosmetics and clothing), and 
others in a mixture (e.g., potatoes and pantyhose ). 15 An abundant supply of imported foreign goods, 
however, provides traders with opportunities to diversify their stock. In all cases, value is added in 
attempts to meet consumer demands and incomes are generated for households of the poor. 
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The percentages of borrowers trading different types of products add over 100 percent 
because many clients typically trade more than one type of product. 
Many domestically-produced goods are sold as imports and the use of fake brand labels is 
extensive. Some microentrepreneurs actually specialize in producing labels. 
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Housing conditions and ownership 
Housing conditions are one social indicator expected to be highly correlated with the wealth 
and income status of clients of these organizations. While in rural areas most clients live in houses 
that are separate structures, in urban areas at least two-fifths of them live in rooms in collective 
housing arrangements (conventillos). A higher proportion of FIE clients live in apartments (17 
percent) compared to clients of the other organizations (Table 4, item 1). 
In urban areas, the average size of the residence ranges from 1.8 rooms for BancoSol to 2.1 
rooms for FIE clients (Table 4, item 2). Residences are smallest for PROD EM clients in rural areas 
( 1. 6 rooms per household). The small size of their residences, in spite of the large size of their 
households, is indicative of their poverty (Navajas et al., 1996). Over three-quarters of these 
households have five members or more. 
About half of the clients surveyed in urban areas own their residence. This proportion ranges 
from 49 percent for BancoSol clients to 58 percent for clients of Caja Los Andes (Table 4, item 3). 
This difference is consistent with the lending technology of Caja Los Andes, which places 
importance on the client having an established place of residence. It may also reflect socio-
economic di±Ierences among the clienteles of these organizations. In the rural areas, the proportion 
of clients who own their residence is significantly higher (84 percent for Sartawi and 88 percent for 
PRODEM). This may reflect, in part, the consequences of land reform programs. 
Access to public services 
Client access to running water, electricity, and sewer is heavily determined by location 
because social infrastructure is much better developed in urban areas than in rural areas. In urban 
areas over 90 percent of the clients of these organizations have running water and electricity, while 
this proportion is considerably less Gust over 60 percent) in rural areas (Table 4, item 4). In urban 
areas, however, the proportion of Banco Sol clients with access to running water is considerably less 
than for clients of FIE and Caja Los Andes. This suggests that BancoSol clients are poorer (Navajas 
et al., 1996). 
Sewage facilities are less common in general, with a clear distinction between BancoSol (57 
percent) and other urban microfinance clients (about 75 percent). This distinction again suggests 
that BancoSol clients may be poorer than clients of FIE and Caja Los Andes. Access to sewage 
facilities is almost non-existent in rural areas. The results for Sartawi are similar to those for 
PRODEM clients for all three of these public services indicators. 
Migration 
A high proportion of the clients of these organizations consider themselves to originate in 
the area of their present residence. This is the case for two-thirds of those now in urban areas and 
the proportion is even higher in rural areas (Table 3, item 12). Immigration has been intense in and 
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around La Paz, so the informal economy has grown rapidly and suburban areas, such as El Alto 
have mushroomed in population. It was expected, therefore, that recent migrants would make u; 
a larger proportion of clients than these data report. The explanation may be that stability of 
residence is an important determinant of perceived creditworthiness by these microfinance 
organizations. Stability is also likely to be an important determinant of the ability to find other 
persons willing to offer joint liability in group loans. 
The importance of residential stability in client selection is further confirmed by the fact that 
the average length of time the client has lived in the area is quite high: it ranges from 17 years 
(PRODEM) to 25 years (Sartawi) in rural areas and from 19 years (FIE) to 24 years (Caja Los 
Andes) in urban areas (Table 3, item 13). Note that if the average age is about 40 years, and the 
clients have lived from 20 to 25 years in the area of their present residence, the average age at the 
time of migration was 15 to 20 years old. Therefore, these clients are well established relative to 
more recent migrants. 
Rural-urban links 
Almost one-fifth of urban clients own land in rural areas, which suggests that they maintain 
strong urban-rural linkages (Table 3, item 14 ). Some of these urban micro finance organizations 
indicated that there is a surge in the demand for loans at the times of planting. This not only reveals 
the clients' diversification strategies to deal with risk, which include both urban and rural activities, 
but also the permeating consequences of the fungibility of money. Multiple urban and rural 
household-enterprise activities suggest even greater difficulties in evaluating the impact of loans on 
productivity and welfare. The five microtinance organizations recognize, however, the nature of 
fungibility and look at the global household-enterprise in their evaluations of creditworthiness and 
in the design of the terms and conditions of their loan contracts .. 
About 80 percent of rural clients claimed to own land, although it was not clear if this was 
under individual or collective forms of tenure (Table 3, item 14). The value of land potentially 
otiered as loan collateral is reduced by tenure patterns and attenuated property rights such as 
communal ownership and legal limitations for land reform beneficiaries. 16 Moreover, many of these 
owners will not likely have formal titles to their land. Surrendering such titles when they have them 
represents, however, an important form of collateral substitute in urban areas, given the high costs 
of formalization of mortgage contracts. Some microfinance organizations have discovered that 
simply requesting the client to deposit the title documents with them acts as a strong deterrent to 
default, regardless of the legal value of such requirements, as the client could always obtain a 
duplicate of the documents from the authorities and no foreclosure is possible without judicial 
process. 
16 Recent legislation passed after the survey has allowed land reform beneficiaries to mortgage 
their land. 
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Informality of economic activities 
The urban clients of these microfinance organizations operate largely in the informal 
economy of La Paz and El Alto. Several indicators ret1ect this. First, in the urban areas less than 
one-half of the clients have a business operated separately from the household. This proportion 
ranges from a low of 44 percent for BancoSol to a high of 52 percent for FIE clients (Table 5, item 
7). In mral areas, only one-third of the clients claimed such separation, a finding which is consistent 
with agriculture being their primary activity. In all organizations except BancoSoL the separatiOn 
of household and business accounts and cash flows ts slightly more frequent among women than 
among men clients. 
The lack of separation of household and business accounts and cash flows suggests that 
financial management is undertaken jointly for the household (on the basis of consumption 
decisions) and the enterprise (on the basis of production and investment decisions). When a loan 
is granted in this environment, the opportunities for the marginal reallocation of funds that are 
allowed by the fungibility of money are significant. When this is the case, targeting loans by the use 
of funds does not make sense. Instead, in establishing loan repayment capacity microfinance 
programs must consider the household-enterprise unit in its entirety. Demands for financial services 
and levels of creditworthiness result from the interactions between the decisions of the household 
and the decisions of the enterprise, and microfinance organizations must take this non-separability 
into account. 
Second, the informality of these microenterprises is reflected by the fact that only a small 
proportion of them pay federal taxes (Registro Unico de Contribuyentes). These taxes are paid by 
about one-third of the clients of FIE and Caja Los Andes and by less than one-quarter of Banco Sol 
clients (Table 5, item 13). Moreover, this is true for less than 10 percent ofPRODEM and Sartawi 
clients in rural areas. From the perspective of these microlenders, the formality associated with 
paying ta'Ces is not necessary for establishing the creditworthiness ofborrowers of very small loans. 
Third, 48 percent of Banco Sol clients are members of some union or association, but not all 
pay union dues (Table 5, item 12). About two-fifths of the clients of Caja Los Andes and of FIE 
have such affiliation, which may be highly correlated with trading activities. Prime street vending 
locations along the sidewalks in La Paz and El Alto are managed by informal trader associations. 
This is also the reason why approximately two-thirds of the urban borrowers pay fees to the 
municipality, mostly for operating permits. Borrower possession of these permits is important to 
these lenders only to the extent to which the permits secure some stability for the client's business. 
Rural clients frequently join producer associations and village organizations. 
Accounting records 
Lack of financial statements and other written records constrains access to conventional 
formal loans as much as lack of traditional collateral. The development oflending technologies that 
do not rely exclusively on standard financial information and on collateralizable assets is a formida-
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ble innovation. This technological itmovation is the central factor explaining the depth and breadth 
of the outreach achievements of these micro finance organizations (Gonzalez-Vega et a!., 1996) 
Reflecting the informality of their businesses, many clients of these micro finance organiza-
tions do not even keep written accounts of their revenues and expenses. This is more frequently the 
case among clients of BancoSol ( 63 percent) than among clients of Caja Los Andes (51 percent) and 
FIE ( 42 percent). From this perspective, informality is even more pronounced in the rural areas, 
where 76 percent (Sartawi) and 84 percent (PROD EM) of the clients do not keep written records 
(Table 5, item 8). There are no major differences between women and men in this connection (Table 
5, item 9). 
Although the lack of written records may not negatively affect the management of their 
microenterprises, as these entrepreneurs carefully and flexibly take advantage of their opportunities 
even vvithout such formal records, the absence of these records reduces the ability of the clients to 
signal creditworthiness in formal financial markets (Sanchez, 1996). In the absence of such records 
the lending technology developed by these microfinance organizations shifts the burden of 
establishing creditworthiness to the loan officers. This may be accomplished through visits to the 
home and/or workplace of the client (e g, Caja Los Andes) and/or through the knowledge of the 
client by other group members who participate in the process of screening on behalf of the lender 
(e g., BancoSol). 
Employment 
An argument frequently made in support of the promotion of microenterprises is their 
potential to create employment for poor people. The survey revealed that the enterprises of the 
clients of these organizations are a source of employment for several persons other than the 
borrowers. When the urban clients of these organizations employ others, on the average they employ 
two or three remunerated permanent workers, one or two temporary workers during seasonal peaks, 
and one relative without explicit remuneration (Table 5, item 1 0). Rural clients who employ others 
on average employ one or two relatives without explicit remuneration, one permanent worker, and 
four or five temporary workers in response to the nature of agricultural activities. 
Not all enterprises employ all ofthese categories of workers. Considering all enterprises in 
the sample, both the enterprises of the self-employed and those of employers, the average number 
of workers employed besides the clients themselves is about 1.2 employees for Banco Sol borrowers 
(Table 5, item 11). 17 In addition to the client, on average employment generation was higher among 
FIE clients (2.2 extra workers) and borrowers of Caja Los Andes (2.1 extra workers). These 
differences in employment generation are consistent with the larger proportion of trading clients in 
17 These figures result from adding all categories of workers and do not weight temporary 
workers differently from permanent workers. 
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BancoSol' s portfolio. In rural areas, Sartawi clients generated more employment beyond their own 
job (1.7 extra workers) than PRODEM clients (1.3 extra workers). 
Although there is no information about how much of this reported employment can be 
attributed to the client's access to microloans, clearly the tinanc1al transactions with these 
microfinance organizations help sustain some job-generating enterpnses. Furthermore, this employ-
ment can have Important welfare benefits because it is logical to expect that poor entrepreneurs 
would most likely employ other poor people. Access to loans may also provide some of these firms 
with flexibility to hire additional workers when needed to take advantage of special opportunities. 
Furthermore, given the fungibility of funds, loans from these organizations facilitate activities of 
household members engaged in other occupations different from the client's enterprise. 
Value of sales 
An alternative way to evaluate the size of a microenterprise is to estimate the total value of 
sales, but this approach is subject to numerous difficulties of measurement and interpretation. The 
difficulties include the pronounced seasonality of sales and the different rates of turnover in 
inventories that are typical of different subsectors of economic activity. Moreover, given different 
profit margins, the value of sales is only a crude proxy for the entrepreneur's net income. 18 The data 
presented below, therefore, must be interpreted with extreme caution and are only suggestive of 
enterprise size. 
The data reported here are estimates made by loan officers based on information in the 
client's files and adjusted to dollars as ofDecember 1995. 19 The clients ofCaja Los Andes reported 
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The demands for tinancial services of different enterprises depend on a combination of 
factors which include sales volume and inventory turnover. For example, a market woman 
who sells US$ 50 each day and turns over her inventory daily will report monthly sales of 
about US$ 1,500. Her working capital requirements, however, will be about US$ 50. A 
furniture maker who completes one bedroom set worth US$ 750 every two weeks will also 
report monthly sales of US$ 1500, but he will require working capital of about US$ 750. 
The loan officers of these organizations develop an intimate knowledge of the typical 
volumes of sales and the working capital requirements of different activities. 
Monetary values have been expressed in terms of dollars because it is a stable currency 
whose purchasing power is more widely known than is the purchasing power represented by 
one boliviano. Monetary values have been converted to represent purchasing power as of 
December, 1995 because the purchasing power of a given number of units of a currency 
changes over time due to inflation. Inflating boliviano values for earlier dates by a factor 
equal to the inflation rate between those dates and December, 1995 and then converting the 
bolivianos to dollars at the exchange rate prevailing as of December, 1995 puts all values in 
comparable units. 
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the highest monthly average sales (US$ 2, 720). The sales of the clients of FIE follow close behind 
(US$ 2,.? 52\ ar:d t~1e c!!ents of Banc0So! h:1vc mcnthly :1' erag~ .:d~s of less t:-::n:. !1alf as much as 
the other two urban organizatiOns (US$ 1,059). In view of the greater proportion ofBancoSol clients 
engaged in petty trade, their enterprises are expected to be smaller. Given the rapid turnover of the 
inventory of goods of small traders, however, the ratio of monthly sales to assets (inventories) is 
typically very high. The relative size of these enterprises, therefore, is even smaller than is ret1ected 
by these comparisons of monthly sales.20 
The average value of sales is even lower for the clients ofPRODEM (US$ 778). 21 The lower 
levels of monthly sales reported for rural clients are not necessarily a reflection of greater poverty, 
because rural producers have greater access to self-production and other in-kind incomes than do 
urban clients. Cash sales are necessary, however, to service the frequent loan payments required by 
these organizations. The need to generate these cash flows may in part explain the predominance 
of traders among the clients of these micro finance organizations even in rural areas. 
Median values for monthly sales are considerably lower than average values (Table 5, item 
14). This suggests that average values are influenced by a few larger producers (outliers) and that 
the typical clients operate smaller enterprises than is reflected by average sales volumes. The 
ranking of the organizations, however, is preserved. The clients of Caja Los Andes report the 
highest typical (median) value of sales (US$ 1, 735), followed by FIE clients (US$ 1 ,240). Again, 
the median sales of BancoSol clients (US$ 646) are less than one-half and the median sales of 
PRODEM clients (US$ 419) are less than one-third of the figures for FIE and Caja Los Andes. 
These distinctions are reflected, according to sex, by the distributions of the clienteles of 
these organizations by levels of monthly sales (Table 5, items 16 and 17). The proportions of 
BancoSol clients with less than US$ 1,000 of monthly sales (60 percent ofthe men and 73 percent 
of the women) are much higher than for the other two urban organizations (Table 5, items 18 and 
19). These proportions are 40 percent for men and 39 percent for women in the case of FIE clients 
and only 16 percent for men and 36 percent for women for clients ofCaja Los Andes. In rural areas, 
72 percent of men and 81 percent of the women clients of PRODEM reported monthly sales of less 
than US$1,000. 
Three facts stand out. First, Caja Los Andes appears to be more cautious and lends to clients 
with low values of sales less frequently than the other organizations. The lending technology of Caja 
20 Size of loan demanded should also be smaller than for non-trading enterprises by a greater 
proportion than is implied by the differences in monthly sales among the clients of these 
organizations. 
21 The typical shortcomings in measuring sales values may be less acute in this study because 
the data were provided by loan officers, except for Sartawi which does not compile such 
information on clients. Data on Sartawi clients are not provided for this reason. 
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Los Andes emphasizes the determination of this value more than is typical for the other lenders.n 
The !JWportinns of clients ofCaj:1 Los Andes \Vith monthly sules over US$ 2.000 (58 percent of men 
and 36 percent of women) are higher than for the other organizations (Table 5, items 16 and 17). 
BancoSol, in contrast, tends to lend to clients with lower values of sales. The proportions of clients 
with sales above US$ 2,000 are only 17 percent for men and 11 percent for women for BancoSol 
clients. 
Second, the proportions of women clients with low values of sales are higher than for men 
for all four organizations. Similarly, the average and the median values of sales are higher for men 
than for women, particularly for clients of Caja Los Andes. Among clients of Caj a Los Andes, the 
average (US$ 3,506) and median (US$ 2,393) sales for men are much higher than the average (US$ 
2,251) and median (US$ 1 ,363) sales for women (Table 5, item 14). Such di.tierences of the monthly 
value of sales according to sex are much less pronounced among FIE clients and almost non-existing 
among BancoSol clients. The differences are large, however, for PRODEM clients. 
Third, low values of sales are more frequent in rural areas than in urban areas. This reflects 
both the lower levels of income and the higher degrees of self-sufficiency of rural household-
enterprises. Differences in sales value also reflect differences in occupations. For both women and 
men, sales values are higher in trade than in other occupations (Table 5, line 15).23 This is true for 
all four organizations and may reflect the more rapid turnover of inventories in trading. Sales in 
manufacturing a..'1d in agriculture are higher than sales in service activities, which are associated with 
the lowest monthly revenues generate by these broad categories of occupations. 
Credit deepening 
The value of monthly sales can be compared to the size ofloans received. This reflects both 
the relative burden on the clients of debt service as well as the extent to which loan supplies may be 
approaching (maximum) repayment capacity. Credit deepening reflects the relationship between 
credit and the value of output (sales). Given equivalent sales values and credit demands, borrowers 
better able to signal their creditworthiness will get larger loans. This is typically the case for the 
clients as their relationship with the microfinance organization matures and as a solid credit history 
is accumulated. For a given client, therefore, loan sizes increase as the client makes progress along 
a sequence of transactions with the same organization, even if the value of sales does not grow as 
rapidly (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997). 
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The degree of detail used in these estimates by the loan officers, however, varies across these 
organizations. This may in part explain, for example, the wider range of sales values 
observed for clients of Caja Los Andes, where such estimations are more accurate. 
For male clients, the value of sales for each occupation is almost identical for FIE and Caja 
Los Andes. This is not the case, however, for women: the value of their sales m 
manufacturing and in services is much higher at Caja Los Andes. 
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This is only part of the story, however, since the importance ofloa.n size relative to monthly 
revenues also depends critically on the term to maturity of the loan. To evaluate the burden of debt 
service, what matters is the size of the monthly payment compared to sales, not the size of the loan 
at the time of disbursement. Manufacturers are expected to get larger loans, at longer terms to 
maturity, which may still require a monthly payment equivalent to the payment of a smaller, shorter-
term loan for a trader. 
Credit deepening may be crudely proxied by the ratio of the amount disbursed for the most 
recent loan to the client's monthly sales.24 For clients ofCaja Los Andes, the median of the ratio of 
loan size to the value of monthly sales was 32 percent (Table 6, item 9). For FIE clients the median 
was 59 percent and for BancoSol clients it was 63 percent.25 Keeping all these qualifications in 
mind, the lower loan-to-sales ratio for clients of Caja Los Andes, despite the lower relative 
importance of loans for trade in its portfolio compared to BancoSol, may again suggest a more 
conservative attitude in the determination of loan sizes.26 This would be consistent with this 
organization's efforts to keep arrears and loan losses at minimum levels, which is in part 
accomplished by keeping loan size smaller compared to the client's potential repayment capacity 
(if reflected by monthly sales) than is usual for other organizations. 
BancoSol and FIE, in contrast, appear ready to accept a level of indebtedness closer to 
repayment capacity. Because the relationship between loan size demanded and the value of sales 
can be expected to be lower in the case of clients engaged in trading rather than in manufacturing, 
the data suggest that BancoSolloans may be even closer to (maximum) repayment capacity than is 
true for the other two organizations. This ability may reflect the role of group formation in screening 
potential borrowers. In the case ofBancoSol, however, there is much less correlation between loan 
sizes and levels of poverty (Navajas eta!., 1996). 
Over three-quarters (79 percent) of the clients ofCaja Los Andes and about one-half of FIE, 
BancoSol, and PROD EM clients receive loans equivalent at most to 60 percent of the value of 
monthly sales. This may suggest that loan-size rationing is frequent, particularly among clients of 
Caja Los Andes (Table 6, lines 10 and 11 ). Clients with unsatisfied demands for credit may seek 
other loans from additional lenders. 
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A more accurate measurement of credit deepening would correct for differences in terms to 
maturity. See Gonzalez-Vega et al. (1997). 
Median values are used for the comparison because some outlier observations severely 
distort the average as representative of a typical borrower. 
This may also reflect more precise sales data, given the more detailed and accurate screening 
technology used by Caja Los Andes. 
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V. Loan Characteristics 
This section reports on our analysis of the characteristics of the most recent loa..'1 disbursed 
to the clients of the five microfinance organizations surveyed.27 The data were compiled from the 
loan officer questionnaires. The loans that were still outstanding when the interviews took place had 
been disbursed at different times during the months before the interviews. Moreover, the character-
istics reported for the most recent loan are not necessarily representative of all the transactions in the 
entire stream of loans disbursed to a client during the period of relationship with the organization. 
As borrowers obtain repeat loans, loan features change due to the nature of the lending technologies 
used by these organizations and due to changing borrower demands. Generally, terms and condi-
tions tend to improve as the relationship with the organization ages and the borrower moves along 
a sequence of repetitions. Due to the mix of clients sampled, the most recent loan reported could be 
the first loan for first-time borrowers or the twentieth loan for a long-established client. Important 
differences among the clients of the five organizations are shown in Tables 6 and 8 and are described 
below. 
Average loan size 
Loan sizes matter as a potential proxy for the borrowers' level of poverty, as a reflection of 
the extent to which supply may be fully responding to demand, and as a determinant of the average 
costs of lending (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997). 
The extent to which levels of poverty and loans sizes are correlated has not been established 
in general. Data from the survey, discussed elsewhere, results in a positive but fairly weak correla-
tion between an index of basic needs fulfillment and loan sizes for individual clients within each 
organization (Navajas et al., 1996). This index of basic needs fulfillment is the inverse of an index 
of poverty. Therefore, when measured for the set of clients in each organization, the poorer the 
client, the smaller the loan received. The Spearman correlation coefficient between this index of 
poverty and loan size is 3 7 percent for the pooled sample for the five organizations. The correlation 
is stronger in urban areas than in rural areas. 
Comparisons across organizations also suggest that organizations whose clients score higher, 
on average, on the index of basic needs fulfillment record higher average loan sizes. This correlation 
is strong. According to this information, the clients of these organizations can be ranked from FIE, 
Caja Los Andes, BancoSol, and PRODEM-and-Sartawi, (which cannot be distinguished from this 
27 Results based on the sample may differ from results that would be obtained from the entire 
population of borrowers in the portfolio of these organizations either because of sampling 
errors or because clients in the sampled branches differ systematically from clients at other 
branches. In addition, the results are strongly influenced by the stage of the borrower along 
the evolution of the client-organization relationship (i.e., the number of loan repetitions that 
have occurred.) See Gonzalez-Vega et al. (1997). 
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perspective) in order of increasing poverty (Navajas et al., 1996). As will be shown below, these 
organizations can be ranked in the same order according to loan size. 28 
This correlation is not inevitable. Average loan size reflects other factors besides poverty 
ofthe client. Among these, one prominent determinant of loan size is the willingness ofthe lender 
to grant loans close to the borrower's perceived repayment capacity. These five microfinance 
organizations differ in the extent to which they engage in such loan-size rationing (Gonzalez-Vega 
et al., 1997). The resulting degree of rationing reflects features of the lending technology (the 
accuracy and comparative costs of screening tasks) and the organization's aversion to arrears. 
Other aspects to consider in evaluating loan sizes are the terms to maturity of the loans and 
the length of the client-organization relationship. For a given repayment capacity, longer terms to 
maturity allow for larger loans. For a given repayment capacity, loan-size rationing declines as the 
organization-client relationship ages. Constraints on the availability of loanable funds faced by these 
microfinance organizations and similar liquidity crises may also explain differences in loan sizes. 
Differences in average loan sizes can have profound implications for the average costs of 
lending and, in tum, for the success of these organizations in achieving self-sustainability.29 The 
total costs of lending tend to be independent of loan size. Thus, average costs decline as these costs 
are diluted over larger loan balances. Indeed, when loans are very small, average costs decline 
sharply even with increases in loan sizes that are small in absolute terms. As loan size grows, the 
resulting reduction in average costs gets smaller and smaller.30 
Loan sizes are reported in this and the next section in four different ways. First, they are 
reported as the average and median sizes at the time of disbursement of the loans outstanding at the 
time of the survey. Second, they are reported as the average and median sizes of all the loans 
disbursed to the sample clients during the first nine months of 1995. Third, they are reported as the 
average and median sizes of all the loans received by these clients throughout their whole 
relationship with the organization that supplied the most recent loan. Fourth, they are reported on 
the basis of the total population of clients with loans disbursed during 1994 for each organization. 
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Caja Los Andes ranks ahead of FIE, however, if the organizations are ranked by the value 
of monthly sales of their clients. This reflects the more conservative creditworthiness criteria 
used at Caja Los Andes than at FIE. 
The size distribution of loans in a portfolio must also be analyzed to determine if a sufficient 
number of large loans are being made to offset the high costs of making very small loans. 
If the total costs of granting one loan are $100 and loan size is $200, average costs are 50 
percent. Average cost can be reduced to 40 percent (a gain of 10 percentage points) simply 
by increasing loan size to $250. Another increase of $50, to a loan size of $300, will reduce 
average costs to 33 percent (by less than 10 percentage points). 
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Among the borrowers in the sample, at the time of disbursement the clients of FIE received, 
on average, the largest loans that were still outstanding at the time of the survey (US$ 1,224).31 The 
second largest average loan size (US$ 1,053) was observed for the clients ofCaja Los Andes (Table 
6, item 1 ). On average, the most recent loan received by the Banco Sol clients surveyed was much 
smaller (US$ 602). As expected from their lower value of sales and likely lower incomes, average 
loan size was even smaller for the clients ofPRODEM (US$ 301) and smallest for the clients of 
Sartawi (US$ 228). While modest in absolute amounts, these differences in loan size are quite 
substantial in relative terms. Compared to the average size of Sartawi loans, on average FIE loans 
were 5.4 times larger, loans from Caja Los Andes were 4.6 times larger, BancoSolloans were 2.6 
times larger, and PROD EM loans were 1.3 times larger. Differences of this order have dramatic 
implications for the average costs of lending and on the intermediation margin (spread) needed for 
sustainability without subsidy. 
The amounts reported above, however, reflect an upward bias as estimators of an average of 
the size of all loans disbursed during the year because of the sequential loan size growth that 
characterizes the lending technologies of these organizations. During 1995 several loans may have 
been made to the same client, with the most recent loan being the largest. Thus, when considering 
all the loans that had been granted to the borrowers interviewed during the nine months of 1995 prior 
to the survey, somewhat different magnitudes are observed (Table 6, item 2). From this perspective, 
average loan size was US$ 807 for FIE clients, US$ 734 for clients of Caja Los Andes, US$ 460 for 
BancoSol clients, US$ 266 for PROD EM clients, and US$ 202 for Sartawi clients. The differences 
are comparatively smaller than for the current loan but are still substantial. 32 Compared to the 
average size of loans for Sartawi clients, loans to FIE clients are 4 times larger, loans to clients of 
Caja Los Andes are 3.7 times larger, loans to BancoSol clients are 2.3 times larger, and loans to 
PRODEM clients are 1.2 times larger. 
Finally, when we consider all the loans received from their present microfinance lender by 
the borrowers in the sample throughout their entire relationship with the organization, the same 
ranking of the organizations is preserved (see Table 6, item 3). Compared to the average size of all 
loans disbursed to the Sartawi clients in the sample, those for FIE clients were 5.1 times larger, those 
31 
32 
The amounts reported here correspond to the size at the time of disbursement, not to the 
balances still outstanding, of loans that were outstanding at the time of the survey 
(September 30, 1995). 
This result suggests that loan sizes increased faster during the year for the organizations 
granting the larger loans. The last loan was 52 percent larger than the average loan for the 
year for FIE clients, but only 13 percent larger for Sartawi clients. All values are expressed 
in dollars as explained in footnote 19. 
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for clients ofCaja Los Andes were 3.9 times larger, those for BancoSol were 2 5 tlmes larger, and 
those for PRODEM clients were 1.4 times larger. 33 
These three sets of data on loan srzes contribute to the identification of the market niches of 
these organizatiOns in the areas of the study and suggest the existence of three tiers of clients m 
terms of loan sizes.34 The first tier would be represented by the clients of FIE and Caja Los Andes, 
who mclude a smaller proportion of borrowers engaged in petty trading and who tend to receive 
larger loans at longer terms to maturity. The second tier would incorporate the clients ofBancoSol, 
mostly women engaged in trading, who get smaller loans at shorter terms on average. These loans 
are about one-half to two-thirds the size of loans for clients in the first tier. The third tier accounts 
for the clients ofPRODEM and Sartawi in rural areas, who are granted even smaller loans. These 
loans are about one-fourth the size ofloans for clients in the first tier and about one-half the size of 
loans for clients in the second tier. 
In terms of loan sizes, therefore, there are three distinguishable but closely overlapping 
market niches. The data on client levels of poverty tend to confirm the clientele differences implicit 
in this three-tier market structure (Navajas et al., 1996). The three tiers of the market are close 
enough, however, to suggest strong opportunities for some of the clients of one organization to 
obtain loans in another. 35 As the microfinance market begins to become saturated, particularly in 
La Paz and El Alto, competition among these organizations is becoming very intense. The impact 
of proximity on both borrower and lender transaction costs results in strong competition, on the one 
hand, among the three urban organizations and, on the other hand, between the two rural 
organizations. 
The three-tier differentiation of the clienteles in the areas of the study is less evident 
nationwide. For this assessment, the average loan size data from the sample observations can be 
compared to data for the whole portfolio of these organizations (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997). For 
the twelve-month period ending December 31, 1994 the average size of loan disbursed for the whole 
population of borrowers was US$ 670 for FIE clients, US$ 588 for BancoSol clients, US$ 523 for 
33 
34 
35 
The average and median sizes of all loans received are generally higher than for only those 
granted in 1995. This reflects a reduction of loan sizes in recent years compared to 1993, at 
least for some organizations. It also reflects the recent addition to the portfolio of a large 
number of first-time borrowers, whose loans are smaller. 
Product differences (loans of different sizes and different contract terms and conditions) 
define market niches. The assumption here is that different clientele types are matched to 
these different financial products. The data on client levels of poverty tends to confirm this 
matching assumption. 
Indeed, although there are differences among the means of loan sizes, substantial portions 
of these distributions overlap due to the widespread distributions of loan sizes. 
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clients of Caja Los Andes, US$295 for PROD EM clients, and US$ 220 for Sartawi clients. In the 
cases of FIE and of Caja Los Andes, these averages for the whole portfolio are lower than for the 
sample. These data suggest a clear distinction between at least two different market niches: the 
urban and the rural clienteles. 
Some ofthe differences between the 1994 portfolio data and the 1995 sample data on loan 
sizes reflect the fact that the survey was confined to clients in La Paz, El Alto, and parts of the 
Altiplano, while some of these microfinance organizations have branches in other parts of the 
country, where loan sizes may be different. Most likely, newer, more rural branches serve both 
poorer clients and clients earlier in their sequence of loans, who therefore receive smaller loans than 
urban, richer, and more established clients. These may not be the case, however, at some of 
BancoSol's new urban locations in other cities outside La Paz, where an attractive clientele is being 
served. Also, BancoSol deliberately slowed down the growth of loan sizes during 1995, compared 
to the expansion year of 1994 (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996). 
Generally, however, the size of rural loans is significantly smaller than the size of urban 
loans. The smaller size ofloans is one of the main reasons for the higher average costs oflending 
in rural areas. These higher average costs, combined with greater difficulties of implementing 
group-credit technologies that must rely on frequent loan payments for the monitoring of borrowers, 
suggest the importance of the new experiments with group loans being implemented by PRODEM 
in rural areas. Similarly important are the efforts of Caja Los Andes in bringing individual loans to 
rural areas. Successful implementation of micro lending technologies in agricultural settings would 
represent a critical technological step in expanding the frontier of microfinance. 
Median loan size 
To compare the depth of outreach of these microfinance organizations, the median is a better 
indicator than the mean or average because the median is influenced less by outliers.36 The median 
represents the characteristics of the typical client better. When median loan sizes are analyzed, the 
rankings of the organizations reported above for average loan sizes are maintained. The differences 
among the organizations are less pronounced, however, suggesting less differentiation of their 
market niches than was implied above. 
The same sets of survey data as in the previous section are discussed here. For the most 
recent loan received, median sizes ofUS$ 572 were observed for FIE clients and of US$ 525 for 
clients of Caja Los Andes. This contrasts with a median size of US$ 350 for Banco Sol clients and 
suggests that there are indeed three tiers of clients (Table 6, item 1 ). As expected, median loan sizes 
36 The median is the value that separates the distribution of borrowers in the sample into two 
groups of identical size. One-half of the borrowers have loan sizes smaller than the median, 
and one-half of them have loan sizes larger than the median. 
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were smaller for rural than for urban organizations, but they were not very different bet\veen the two 
rmal organizanons. Medwn sizes were US$ 221 for PRODEM and US$ 215 for Sartawi chents.37 
From the perspective of median loan sizes, the separation of market niches is less pro-
nounced. Compared to the median size of the most recent loan for Sartawi clients, the median for 
FIE loans was 2.7 times larger, for loans ofCaja Los Andes 2.4 times larger, and for BancoSolloans 
1.6 times larger. For PROD EM loans it was the same. These smaller relative differences for median 
loan sizes (as compared to differences in means) suggest that distinctions are not that pronounced 
among the typical clients of the three urban organizations, although some portions of their clienteles 
may differ. These data also suggest that the clients of the two rural organizations are extremely 
similar. The clients of BancoSol typically receive, nevertheless, smaller loan amounts than 
borrowers from the other two urban organizations. 
The typical or median loan sizes are even smaller when one considers all loans disbursed to 
the sample borrowers during the first nine months of 1995 (Table 6, item 2). The median loan size 
was US$ 429 for FIE clients, US$ 366 for clients ofCaja Los Andes, US$ 258 for BancoSol clients, 
US$ 216 for PRODEM clients, and US$ 175 for Sartawi clients. The ranking of the organizations 
observed earlier is preserved. Compared to the median loan size for Sartawi, FIE loans are 2.5 times 
larger, loans from Caja Los Andes are 2.1 times larger, BancoSol loans are 1.5 times larger, and 
PROD EM loans are 1.2 times larger, resulting in an even narrower range of differences in loan sizes. 
These comparative results are also true for the whole string ofloans granted to these borrowers over 
their entire relationship with the organization. In this case, loan sizes ranged from US$ 537 for FIE 
clients to US$ 180 for Sartawi clients (Table 5, item 3). 
In summary, from the perspective of the typical borrowers, these organizations appear to 
operate in similar market niches with three slightly different tiers of clients. The main distinction 
emerges from mban-ftu"al differences, with rural loans being significantly smaller. In turn, among 
the urban organizations, BancoSol clients appear to be poorer and to receive smaller loans than 
clients of the other t\VO organizations and thus occupy an intermediate tier. In all cases, however, 
these organizations are serving comparatively poor people, who most likely will never have access 
to loans from traditional banks, but they are not necessarily reaching the poorest of the poor (Navajas 
eta!., 1996). \\lhether the poorest of the poor are creditworthy cannot be established here. If they 
are not, however, they should not be granted loans (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
Variability of loan sizes 
The narrower range of differences among median values compared to differences among 
average loan sizes suggests, furthermore, that the dispersion of loan sizes is narrower for the 
37 A test for statistically significant differences in median loan sizes suggested that the loans 
from Caja Los Andes and FIE come from the same statistical population of loans and that 
the loans ofPRODEM and Sartawi come from the same population (Navajas et al., 1996). 
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organizations granting the smaller loans. Conversely, the organizatwns grantmg larger loans show 
a"" ider drsperswn of loan sizes. The latter have to be concerned, therefore, with offering a broader 
range of loan contracts that respond to the more complex demands of a more diverse clientele. 
In etTect, as shown in Table 6 (item 4), the standard deviation of loans sizes is much greater 
in the cases of Caja Los Andes (2,090) and FIE (1,745) than for BancoSol (657). The standard 
deviation is even smaller for PRODEM (188) and Sartawi (138). Similarly, the coefficients of 
variation of loan size range from 1.98 for Caja Los Andes to 0.61 for Sartawi.38 The greater 
variability of loan sizes at Caja Los Andes and at FIE is more sharply shown by the ratio of the 
standard deviation with respect to the median of loan sizes (Table 6, item 4). A ranking of 
organizations according to this indicator results in an order identical to that generated by a ranking 
according to loan sizes, namely Caja Los Andes (3.98), FIE (3.05), BancoSol (1.88), PRODEM 
(0.85) and Sartawi (0.64). Therefore, Caja Los Andes and FIE grant a wide range of loan sizes, 
vvhile PRODEM and Sartawi grant a much narrower range of loan sizes and occupy a more focused 
market niche. 
This lack of differentiation among loan products reflects both demand (e.g, poverty) and 
particularly supply considerations, especially for Sartawi, where uniform loan contracts ret1ect 
efforts to keep costs within manageable bounds. BancoSol, in tum, has been experiencing a 
widening of the range of its clientele and is now facing the challenges of product development that 
this expansion implies. 
Distribution of loan sizes 
The depth of outreach of micro finance organizations is reflected in the proportion of their 
portfolios granted in the form of very smallloans.39 The higher this proportion, the greater the depth 
of outreach, and the more formidable the cost challenges that the organization faces when it attempts 
to be sustainable. From this perspective, the two rural organizations and BancoSol among the urban 
microlenders stand out. 
38 
39 
The coefficient of variation is obtained as a ratio of the standard variation with respect to the 
mean of the observations. It is a pure measure of dispersion, because variation is scaled with 
respect to the mean. 
This assumes that there is some correlation between loan sizes and levels of poverty, as 
shown for this sample of borrowers in Navajas et al. (1996). The relationship is stronger 
when one organization is compared to another. Within those organizations that practice 
limited screening and rely on fairly uniform loan sizes (e.g., Sartawi), however, the 
correlation between loan sizes and individual levels of wealth is weak. Depth of outreach 
defined as difficulty of suppling loans is related to both loan size and rlient poverty. 
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As shown in Table 6 (items 5 and 6), 74 percent ofSartawi, 53 percent ofPRODEM, and 34 
percent of Banco Sol clients had current loans at the trme of the survey that had been disbursed in 
amounts of less than US$ 250 These proportions are 27 percent for Caja Los Andes and only 14 
percent for FIE. When the ceiling is raised to US$ 500 loans, almost all rural clients (96 percent of 
Sartawi and 88 percent ofPRODEM clients) and two-thirds ofBancoSol clients (63 percent) fall in 
the category of borrowers of small loans. Thts is also true for almost one-half of the clients of Caj a 
Los Andes (49 percent) and two-fifths ofFIE clients (39 percent). 
Three important facts are worth highlighting. First, all five Bolivian organizations studied 
are true micro lenders and devote substantial portions of their portfolio to loan transactions with a 
disbursement value of less than US$ 500. Outstanding balances are even smaller. 
Second, the two rural lenders not only need to overcome the greater costs associated with less 
density of population and a less developed mfrastructure as well as the potentially higher risks from 
agriculture, but they also grant a much greater proportion of very small loans. 
Third, the loan sizes typical of group-lending organizations (e g., BancoSol) are smaller than 
the loan sizes typical of individual-loan organizations (e g., FIE and Caja Los Andes). Borrowers 
may not be willing to offer jomt liability for larger loans, while poorer people may not possess assets 
to offer as collateral for individual loans. 
These organizations differ, furthermore, according to the size of the loans they are willing 
to grant to first-time borrowers (Gonzalez-Vega eta!., 1997). As shown in Table 6 (items 7 and 8), 
most Sartawi clients (88 percent) and BancoSol clients (78 percent) received a first-time loan ofless 
than US$ 150. This was also true for 54 percent of PROD EM clients, 41 percent of clients of Caja 
Los Andes, and 22 percent of FIE borrowers. The proportions of first-time loarrs of less than US$ 
250 were also very high, ranging from the high values of 98 percent for Sartawi and 93 percent for 
BancoSol borrowers to the lower value of 30 percent for FIE borrowers. All of PROD EM and 
Sartawi first-time loans were below US$ 500. At the other end of the distribution, 20 percent of FIE 
first-time loans were above US$ 1,000 (Table 6, item 7). 
Individual and group loans 
All the loan sizes reported above correspond to loans made to individuals. These loans are 
disbursed, however, according to different lending technologies which use either group or individual 
loan transactions. Caja Los Andes and FIE only make individualloans.40 In the case of Sartawi, in 
contrast, 82 percent of the borrowers are members of credit groups, while all BancoSol and 
PRODEM borrowers receive their loans through groups (Table 6, item 12). The average size of 
40 This is almost always the case for FIE, which makes a few loans to producer associations for 
distribution among their members. Five percent of FIE borrowers in the sample were 
members of these associations (Table 6, item 12). 
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groups is about four members in the cases ofBancoSol and PRODEM and three members in the case 
ofSartawi (Table 6, item 13). 
All of these five organizations have adhered to similar lending principles, which explain the 
success of their outreach to the target clienteles, independently of their use of a group or an indivi-
dual lending technology.41 All of them understand the nature of the demand for financial services 
from their clienteles and the close interaction between household and enterprise decisions. All of 
them have designed credit products that respond to these demands and that are adapted to the 
circumstances of their clienteles. All of them have attempted to reduce the transaction costs of 
borrowers, particularly through the speedy and timely disbursement of loans. All of them have 
projected an image of permanence that enhances the value of client-organization relationships. 
Independently of the structures of incentives that these microfinance organizations have 
adopted to promote loan repayment, all of them emphasize the willingness and ability of the client 
to repay as the criteria to grant loans rather than adopting a rigid targeting of specific beneficiaries. 
In screening applicants, these organizations rely mostly on reputation, as evidenced by character 
references and credit histories. Even when various forms of collateral and collateral substitutes are 
used, these guarantees play a secondary role compared to the development of a long-term personal 
relationship between the loan officers and clients. These incentives to repay are accompanied by an 
immediate and unambiguously harsh reaction to any arrears. These organizations all charge interest 
rates sufficiently high to cover most of the costs of their services and all are seriously concerned with 
their financial viability and with achieving independence from subsidies. The adoption of these 
principles explains their success, independently of the supply of group or individual loans 
(Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996; Gonzalez-Vega, 1996b). 
Frequency of loan payments 
Frequent loan payments represent a key element of the lending technology of these 
microfinance organizations. This feature of the loan contracts allows the lenders to closely monitor 
the borrowers at low cost, by simply tracking repayments. From this perspective, Caja Los Andes 
displayed the strictest lending conditions. The loan outstanding at the time of the survey required 
weekly payments for 43 percent of the clients of Caja Los Andes and bi-weekly payments for an 
additional48 percent of these clients. Only 10 perce: - --:he borrowers of Caja Los Andes had loans 
that required monthly payments (Table 6, item 14). 
The second strictest lender in terms of frequency of loan payments was Banco Sol. The loan 
outstanding required weekly payments for 24 percent, bi-weekly payments for 28 percent, and 
monthly payments for 48 percent of the clients of this organization. The fact that the proportion of 
clients with very frequent payments was lower at BancoSol than at Caja Los Andes may reflect a 
41 This paper does not attempt to resolve the controversy about the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages of group and individual loans. 
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more mature clientele (1 e , clients who have been longer in the portfolio and thus receive less strict 
contract terms) as weH as somewhat more flexible loan conditions generally at BancoSol than at Caja 
Los Andes. 
The greater concentration of loans granted for trade at Banco Sol would also suggest that 
BancoSol clients should be able to make payments more frequently. The clients ofCaja Los Andes, 
however, generally repaid more frequently than did the clients of Banco Sol. This may again show 
a stronger preoccupation with keeping arrears low at Caja Los Andes. Although this strict behavior 
serves to avoid arrears, it may reduce the quality of outreach, because borrowers have to incur the 
high transaction costs of frequent payments. Finding the appropriate contract terms and incentives 
to repay for a particular clientele is not an easy task. 
For FIE clients, payments tended to be even less frequent than for BancoSol clients. About 
24 percent of FIE clients paid weekly, 11 percent paid bi-weekly, and 64 percent made monthly 
payments. Less frequent payments for FIE clients were associated, among other things, with an even 
greater proportion of clients listing manufacturing as their primary occupation than at either Caja Los 
Andes or BancoSol. Less frequent repayments may also suggest that FIE emphasizes this form of 
borrower monitoring less than do the other two urban organizations. 
The much lower frequency of repayment for PROD EM and Sartawi clients ret1ects the poorer 
conditions of rural infrastructure, the longer distances involved, as well as the seasonal nature of 
agriculture. By design, all the Sartawi loans require monthly payments. This reduces both lender 
and borrower transaction costs, which tend to be higher in rural areas than in urban areas. To 
compensate for the higher risk implied, Sartawi's loan sizes are much smaller. PROD EM granted 
loans to 97 percent of its clients with monthly payments. Less frequent payments represent one of 
several efforts employed by PROD EM to tailor the terms of its loans to the special circumstances 
of rural and agricultural clients. This organization has begun to experiment with even less frequent 
payments, to match agricultural cycles, and with flexible repayment schemes that allow different 
combinations of interest payments and amortization of principal even among the members of the 
same credit group. 
Purpose of the loan 
The ostensible purpose for borrowing does not always correspond with the principal 
occupation of the borrower. This is particularly true in rural areas, reflecting the multiple occupa-
tions of household members as well as the preference of micro finance organizations to grant loans 
for activities that generate cash flows and permit frequent payments. Moreover, given the fungibility 
of funds, the stated loan purposes do not necessarily correspond to the activities actually funded by 
the loan, as compared to counterfactual situations without the loan (Von Pischke and Adams, 1983). 
Given their multiple sources and uses of funds, these firm-households add loan funds to a total pool 
of liquidity from which all uses are funded. The same pool of liquidity is used to make the required 
loan payments. Rather than targeting specific loan uses, lenders need to focus on the overall 
household-firm financial management. 
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With this caveat in mind, the predominance of women traders among Banco Sol clients was 
reflected in a large proportion of loans (63 percent) requested for trading activities (Table 6, item 
15).42 Banco Sol was also the organization that granted the largest reported proportion of loans for 
service activities (14 percent). An emphasis on loans for trading activities was also found among 
PRODEM (61 percent) and Sartawi clients (64 percent). Rural clients with trading activities may 
appear to be more creditworthy for these organizations because their sales generate cash flows that 
facilitate more frequent payments. In rural areas, most trading activities involve livestock sales. 
PRODEM (8 percent) and Sartawi (24 percent) are unique among these microfinance 
organizations in their willingness to lend directly for agriculture and livestock activities (Table 6, 
item 15). Lending for these activities requires more complex and potentially expensive lending 
technologies. After transferring most of its urban portfolio to BancoSol, PRODEM has been 
experimenting in efforts to adapt its group lending technology to a rural environment. A few months 
after the survey, Caja Los Andes also began granting individual loans for agriculture in Punata. This 
effort has been an adaptation of the agricultural lending technology developed by Financiera 
CALPIA in El Salvador (Gonzalez-Vega, 1996a). 
Loans for manufacturing activities were particularly important for FIE clients (55 percent) 
and for clients of Caja Los Andes (35 percent). In recent years, however, both organizations have 
been increasing their share of loans for trading activities and reducing their initial emphasis on 
manufacturing. As a result, loans for trading represents 55 percent of loans to clients of Caja Los 
Andes and 39 percent of FIE loans (Table 6, item 15). Caja Los Andes was second to BancoSol in 
its willingness to lend for services (9 percent). 
Guarantees 
Innovations in the use of non-traditional loan guarantees are an important mechanism to 
bring marginal clienteles inside the frontier of formal finance (Esguerra and Meyer, 1992). The 
marginal clienteles targeted by most microfinance organizations usually cannot pledge the physical 
assets that traditional formal lenders require as collateral. The potential borrowers typically do not 
possess the assets required (e.g., real estate) or do not have formal title to such assets. Even when 
they own these assets, the transaction costs for both borrower and lender of legally formalizing 
collateral pledges and of enforcing loan contracts through judicial procedures are prohibitively high 
(World Bank, 1994). Alternative types of guarantees are used instead by these microfinance 
organizations. 
The types of guarantees pledged for loans are among the most salient distinctions across the 
clients of the five micro finance organizations studied. These distinctions, although closely related 
42 Special caution is needed in interpreting these responses. If borrowers perceive that lenders 
prefer to make loans for particular activities, such as trade, they may misrepresent their 
intended purpose in borrowing for the preferred activity. 
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to the nature of the lending technologies used, go beyond the simple differentiation between group 
credit and individual loan transactions. Indeed, the most important condition of the loan contracts 
that appears to separate these organizations may be the types of guarantees required and the ability 
and/or willingness of the borrowers to offer them. This dimension of the lending technology is 
closely related, in turn, to the differentiation in market niches and clientele profiles observed in the 
regions studied. 
With very few exceptions, no traditional forms of banking collateral (e g., mortgages) are 
required by any of these five microfinance organizations. Only four fully-legalized mortgages were 
observed in the sample (three for FIE clients and one for a borrower of Caja Los Andes). In 
addition, eight non-registered mortgages were reported by clients of Caja Los Andes (Table 6, item 
17). This limited use of mortgages reflects the adoption of information-intensive rather than 
collateral-intensive as cost-effective lending technologies to operate in these market niches 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1996c ). This choice of technology reflects, in turn, the limited ability of the clients 
to offer traditional forms of collateral as well as the high costs associated with use of the formal legal 
system to enforce credit contracts (World Bank, 1994). 
Unregistered guarantees, however, offer these microfinance organizations the opportunity 
to design incentives to repay without incurring all the transaction costs associated with the formaliza-
tion of collateral. In Bolivia, borrowers appear to have responded to the threat implicit in these alter-
native guarantees, although the pledges are not legally binding without formalization. The micro-
fb~c'.! organizations that use these guarantees rely on this implicit threat but, given the high costs 
... _.,::._have no intention of formalizing these contracts.43 
Although physical assets are preferred by banks and traditional lenders, in Bolivia a large 
number of legal and regulatory obstacles and deficiencies constrain lending even when clients can 
offer these forms of loan collateral (World Bank, 1994 ). This has given rise to a number of practices 
of questionable legal value but which serve as an effective threat to encourage loan repayment. 
Some of the practices employed by these microfinance organizations (e.g., copying identity cards 
or holding property titles and other documents offered by clients which cannot lead to foreclosure 
in the absence of formalization) are simply designed to encourage repayment through signals of the 
organization's intent to collect the loans. 
One important innovation is that some of these organizations rely almost entirely on personal 
guarantees. These personal guarantees include cosigners (garantes), who may or may not be 
43 Prudential regulation rules that apply to BancoSol and Caja Los Andes may force these 
organizations to start legal procedures in cases when these efforts are not cost-effective. 
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relatives of the borrowers and who may have to demonstrate their ability to repay through wealth 
or employment. Joint liability pledged in group loans is also a personal guarantee:14 
Other organizations require liens on consumer goods or producer durables as substitutes for 
traditional mortgages. The assets pledged (television sets, sound equipment, sowing machines) are 
typically within the reach of most of these firm-households except for the poorest. Frequently, 
formal liens (prendas) are not legally documented due to the transaction costs involved. In other 
cases, transfers of ownership allow repossession by the lender of the goods pledged without prior 
judicial process. The lenders try to avoid repossessing goods that must be stored, however, but 
occasionally do it in order to set an example. FIE avoids some of these issues by engaging in 
leasing. 
The inability or unwillingness to pledge even these simple assets may separate, however, 
those who seek group loans, with the additional transaction costs involved, from those vvho prefer 
individual loans. Group credit engenders some borrower transaction costs not present in individual 
loan contracts. These costs result from the peer monitoring efforts required from borrowers if they 
want to avoid the obligation to pay another members' loans. Transaction costs also emerge from the 
need to coordinate the borrowing activities of the entire group. These transaction costs and the 
rigidities associated with synchronous group transactions may reduce the quality of the credit 
services provided, but some clients either may have no other option or may prefer these terms and 
conditions to being obliged to pledge other forms of collateral (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996). 
Joint liability is the guarantee offered by 97 percent of the BancoSol clients incmJ.cd in the 
survey (Table 6, item 17). This corresponds to the group lending technology universally used by 
this organization.45 Most BancoSol loans (95 percent) are guaranteed this way only. In a few 
exceptional cases, however, Banco Sol accepted combinations of more traditional guarantees pledged 
for larger loans. Joint liability is also used by all PRODEM borrowers. In PROD EM the pledge of 
joint liability is frequently supplemented, however, with other personal guarantees (33 percent) or 
with other forms of collateral (Table 6, item 18). An implicit joint liability guarantee is also used 
by Sartawi borrowers, but one member of the group must surrender the original title for land and 
then seek repayment by the rest of the group. Several combinations of guarantees, including liens 
on livestock, are also observed among the clients ofPRODEM and Sartawi. 
As shown in Table 6 (item 17), the guarantee most frequently observed among the clients of 
Caja Los Andes is a lien on consumer durables (91 percent). By themselves, these liens were suffi-
44 
45 
Prudential regulation rules limit the proportion of the portfolio of formal intermediaries that 
may be backed by personal guarantees. This is one of the most serious obstacles to the 
expansion of micro finance resulting from the prudential regulation framework. 
For all practical purposes, all of BancoSol borrowers are granted loans in groups. The 
sample may have reflected a few exceptions or a few response errors. 
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cient, however, for only 38 percent of the borrowers and they were most frequently supplemented 
by a cosigner (29 percent). Multiple combinations of guarantees involving copies of the original of 
the title on real estate, liens on phone cooperative shares, and other assets are used (Table 6, item 
18). Caja Los Andes also operates a pawnshop where gold and gold jewelry are offered as 
guarantee. 
Personal guarantees are the most frequent guarantee observed among FIE clients (55 
percent), while liens on consumer durables are also used (24 percent). Personal guarantees, however, 
by themselves are sufficient for only 24 percent of FIE clients. The most frequent combination is 
obtained by adding a lien on consumer durables (11 percent). A wider range of combinations of all 
types of guarantees is observed among the borrowers of this organization, which also engages in 
leasing operations (Table 6, item 18). 
Arrears 
One of the important positive results of the innovations in lending technologies introduced 
by these microfinance organizations is that they have not only managed to increase access to loans 
for marginal clienteles but that in doing so they have also reduced arrears and default rates to levels 
below those recorded for many formal financial intermediaries. An attempt was made in the survey 
to obtain data about this important aspect of the client-organization relationship. The loan officers 
were asked to record the maximum number of days the clients had been in arrears for payment of 
any loan installment before the situation was resolved, for all loans during their relationship with the 
client and for the most recent loan . The data revealed rapid resolution of any problem for all those 
who had been in arrears.46 
With respect to the current loan outstanding, the average maximum length of arrears across 
clients with arrears is short, averaging just one day for BancoSol, three days for PRODEM and 
Sartawi, four days for Caja Los Andes, and five days for FIE (Table 6, item 16). Concerning the 
repayment history reported for all previous loans borrowed by the clients, the average maximum 
number of days of arrears for those with arrears is somewhat higher but follows a similar pattern. 
The organizations with group-credit technologies (PRODEM and BancoSol) show the shortest 
period: on average two or three days of arrears before resolution. The ma"Ximum arrears for the other 
three organizations range from six to ten days before resolution. The dynamics of group loans appear 
to offer less flexibility in dealing with individual arrears and to require a more immediate reaction. 
The threat of not reacting immediately to arrears is compounded by the absence of real collateral. 
46 Note that these figures are susceptible to sample selection bias, as clients with lower maxi-
mum arrears in the past are more likely to get a new loan and thus more likely to be in the 
population of clients sampled. Clients with repeated or more prolonged arrears are more 
likely to have dropped out or have been rejected in a new loan application. 
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Falling into a few days of arrears is a frequent event, as would be expected, given the nature 
of these microenterprises. Indeed, high proportions of the borrowers in the sample had been at least 
one day late in the payment of at least one installment of their current loans. 47 Loan officers in these 
organizations have different degrees of discretion in reacting to these frequent arrears and use their 
knowledge of the individual clients to forecast when a few days of arrears are a serious problem that 
merits their intervention or not. When they recognize that there is no problem, no action is taken and 
payment occurs one or two days later. If a problem is suspected, however, the reaction is immediate. 
Loan officer skills in differentiating between these two situations are sharp. Thus, what is 
outstanding is that in all cases these arrears are corrected within a few days and that, as a result, the 
organizations have suffered insignificant losses from default (Gonzalez-Vega et a!., 1997). 
VI. Financial Transactions 
The survey was designed to capture data about the clients' full range of financial transactions, 
both with the five microfinance organizations and elsewhere. The results reported below reveal that 
transactions with other formal financial institutions are limited. Informal financial transactions, 
however, are more frequent and roughly consistent with the results of other research (Adams and 
Canavesi, 1992; Hannig et a!., 199-1). Therefore, the financial services provided by these five 
microfinance organizations have probably added an important set of options to the financial 
management opportunities of these firm-households. Given the importance of such options for risk 
management and for taking advantage of productive opportunities by poor households, the services 
provided by these organizations have the potential to make important improvements in the welfare 
of their clients. 
Holdings of financial assets 
Few of the clients interviewed reported holding formal financial assets besides cash as part 
of their wealth.48 The major exception are 37 percent ofBancoSol clients who reported holding bank 
savings accounts (Table 7, item 1). Fewer clients ofCaja Los Andes (13 percent) and ofFIE (10 
percent) hold savings accounts.49 This result suggests that by offering voluntary deposit facilities 
BancoSol may have induced its clients to keep savings accounts more frequently than does 
participation in the credit programs of the other two urban organizations. Thus, BancoSol's clients 
47 
48 
49 
These proportions ranged between 17 percent for BancoSol, 23 percent for PRODEM, 33 
percent for Sartawi, 44 percent for Caja Los Andes, and 66 percent for FIE. 
There is always a concern in survey research that interviewees will under-report their 
financial assets. The high proportion of clients who admitted to interviewers that they held 
cash, however, provides evidence of the robustness of the data collected. 
A survey of 422 households in the town of Minero revealed that between 7.6 and 13.3 
percent of them held savings accounts (Wisniwski, 1995). 
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may be truly new depositors, rather than existing savers who shifted their funds from other financial 
intermediaries. BancoSol may have thereby created additionality in the market for small deposits, 
and this can be assumed to increase household welfare. 
Less than 10 percent of the clients of any of these organizations hold deposits in cooperatives 
or in savings and loans associations, although such holdings are more frequent among clients ofCaja 
Los Andes than among FIE or BancoSol clients. 5° Holdings of deposits in any type of formal 
financial intermediary are almost non-existent in rural areas. Holdings of checking accounts, also 
non-existent in rural areas, range from 4 percent (FIE) to 10 percent (BancoSol) in urban areas 
(Table 7, item 1). Use of credit cards is even more infrequent. 
Participation in ROSCAs 
Despite access to loans from the five microfinance organizations, an important proportion 
of their clients continue to participate in informal financial arrangements. This is particularly true 
for BancoSol borrowers: 32 percent of them are members ofpasanakus, the local form of rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). This proportion is 22 percent for FIE clients and 20 
percent for clients of Caja Los Andes. Participation in pasanakus may be more frequent among 
clients engaged in trading because cash flows from sales facilitate the regular contributions required. 
Also, market places and other concentrations oftraders in particular locations facilitate meetings and 
regular contact among traders. This may also explain the higher rate of pasanaku participation 
among women than among men. In urban areas, this rate ranges from 39 percent (BancoSol) to 28 
percent (Caja Los Andes) for women and from 17 percent (FIE) to 8 percent (Caja Los Andes) for 
men (Table 7, item 1). It was somewhat surprising to find that participation in ROSCAs is less 
frequent in rural areas than in urban areas. Only 8 percent of Sartawi and 18 percent of PROD EM 
clients indicated participation in pasanakus (Table 7, item 1). These rates are again higher for 
women than for men. 
These proportions are generally lower than the rates of participation in pasanakus found by 
Adams and Canavesi in 1987. These researchers interviewed people waiting for buses and making 
purchases in central markets in La Paz. They found that 3 5 percent of the persons interviewed 
participated in pasanakus. It is not possible to determine if any differences in participation in 
informal arrangements reflect the impact of access to credit provided by these microfinance 
organizations or simply sampling errors. 
The higher proportion of pasanaku participants among BancoSol (urban) and PROD EM 
(rural) clients may suggest a self-selection process by clients who prefer or are well-suited for group-
based financial activities. Participation in pasanakus may also generate the trust and the financial 
discipline needed for participation in borrowing groups. It was not possible to determine if group 
50 This suggests that there may be some demand for the deposit services that Caja Los Andes 
began to offer its clients a few months after the survey. 
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members are recruited among fellow participants in a pasanaku, but earlier contact with such 
partners clearly facilitates group formation. 
Reserves for emergencies 
The holding of liquid reserves for emergencies (precautionary purposes) is critical for the 
poor because without these reserves they will hardly survive unexpected shocks to their income. 
Liquid reserves also allow them to take advantage of unanticipated opportunities when they emerge 
(speculative purposes). Among the borrowers in the sample, keeping cash at home is the most 
frequent form of asset holdings for these purposes. Table 7 (item 2) shows that 53 percent of the 
clients of Caja Los Andes, 43 percent of Banco Sol clients, and 42 percent of FIE clients keep cash 
available for emergencies. 51 
The practice of holding cash reserves is even more frequent in rural areas, where 69 percent 
ofPRODEM and 62 percent ofSartawi clients keep cash at home for emergencies (Table 7, item 2). 
This is not surprising, given the limited financial infrastructure available and the more pronounced 
risks that households generally encounter in rural areas. The importance of precautionary reserves 
is also reflected in the frequency of using livestock as a reserve for emergencies ( 49 percent of 
PRODEM and 40 percent ofSartawi clients). Livestock, however, are considerably less liquid than 
cash and deposits. Attractive deposit faciliti~s may induce a substitution away from risky tangible 
assets and promote rural financial intermediation. 
Livestock are not used for emergencies in urban areas. Instead, financial assets and partici-
pation in pasanakus are the mechanisms most frequently used to complement holdings of cash, 
which are ranked first (Table 7, item 2). The clients ofBancoSol have found opportunities to keep 
bank deposits for these purposes more frequently (43 percent) than the clients ofCaja Los Andes (15 
percent) or of FIE (12 percent). These deposits are hardly ever observed in rural areas. 
The clients' answers suggest that participation in pasanakus is mostly motivated by 
precautionary motives. In terms of the amounts involved, pasanakus are not as important, but they 
are a main strategy for dealing with emergencies for 32 percent ofBancoSol clients, 22 percent of 
FIE clients, and 18 percent of clients of Caja Los Andes (Table 7, item 2). Participation in 
pasanakus as a way of dealing with emergencies is less frequent for rural clients: 16 percent of 
51 These proportions are consistent with those found by other researchers in these and other 
regions of Bolivia: 46 percent of households in La Paz and 64 percent in Santa Cruz held 
cash reserves in 1994 (Wisniwski, 1995). The high proportion of cash holdings among the 
clients of Caja Los Andes is also suggestive of a potential demand for deposit services. 
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PRODEM and 8 percent of Sartawi clients see pasanakus as a way of dealing with unforeseen 
events. 52 
Jewelry is most frequently observed as a reserve among the clients of Caja Los Andes (6 
percent). Clients with jewelry may be attracted to Caja Los Andes because this organization offers 
pawn loans which allow jewels to be converted to cash quickly. Caja Los Andes is alone in 
providing this popular and valuable service to its clients. Most of them possess these types of assets 
and very little screening of borrowers is required before a loan is granted. These services are 
valuable because lack of access to loans for emergencies may have the unfortunate consequence of 
leading to the liquidation of productive assets as the only alternative in dealing with an income shock 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1996b). 
Main forms of holding savings 
The most common main form of holding savings for the clients of the five micro finance 
organizations is cash (Table 7, item 3). This is true particularly among the clients ofCaja Los Andes 
( 46 percent) and of Sartawi ( 45 percent), and it may reflect a strong liquidity preference among these 
tirm-households. 
A most interesting observation, however, are the less frequent holdings of cash as the main 
form of savings among Banco Sol clients (31 percent).53 Instead, deposits in a financial institution 
are the main form of holding savings for 26 percent of the borrowers ofBancoSol. Deposits are the 
main form of savings for the clients of FIE (13 percent) and Caja Los Andes (12 percent) much less 
frequently. Deposits as the main form of savings are almost nonexistent in rural areas. 
The more frequent holdings of deposits as a main form of savings among the clients of 
BancoSol suggests a revealed transformation of savings from cash forms into deposits, when 
convenient and safe deposit facilities were offered to its clientele by this bank. If indeed this is the 
case, it appears that improved access to financial savings opportunities is potentially welfare-
improving for these clients and that there is a demand for such services which, given appropriate 
conditions, can be satisfied by microfinance organizations that mobilize deposits. This may imply, 
in turn, that the insignificant importance of deposits as a main form of holding savings in rural areas 
52 
53 
These figures refer to participation in pasanakus as a strategy for dealing with emergencies 
(Table 7, item 2), as different for participation inpasanakus generally, for any reason (Table 
7, item 1). 
The question about holdings of reserves for emergencies discussed above reported the fre-
quency with which particular assets were held for these purposes. Cash was held by 43 per-
cent of the clients ofBancoSol to deal with emergencies (Table 7, item 2). Cash represented 
the main form of savings, however, for only 31 percent of these borrowers (Table 7, item 
3). 
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is not necessarily due to lack of demand for such facilities but to shortcomings of their supply 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1996b). 
The main forms of holding savings also reflect the occupations of the clients. Inventories 
are important in urban areas as the main form of holding savings for 35 percent of FIE clients and 
31 percent of the clients of Caja Los Andes (Table 7, item 3 ). In rural areas, inventories are also the 
main form of holding savings for 25 percent ofPRODEM clients. Again, it is interesting that for 
the clients of BancoSol, in spite of the predominance of trade among them, inventories are the main 
form of holding savings for only 22 percent of those surveyed. This suggests that access to deposit 
facilities may have improved the clients' cost effectiveness in inventory management. This would 
imply that opportunities to deposit can increase the productivity of these enterprises. Pasanakus 
are the main form of keeping savings for 18 percent of Banco Sol clients and less frequently in all 
other cases. This may reflect the predominance of ROSCAs among women engaged in petty trade. 
Occupational specialization is also reflected in the frequency of livestock as the most 
important form of keeping savings in rural areas: 36 percent for Sartawi and 30 percent for 
PRODEM clients (Table 7, item 3). It is impossible to predict how much these rural holdings of 
livestock and of inventories would be transformed into financial assets if convenient deposit 
facilities became available. Experience in other countries suggests that the demand for deposit 
facilities is significant and the potential transformation substantial (Gonzalez-Vega et a!., 1993; 
Robinson, 1994). 
Willingness to deposit 
The potential for deposit mobilization is confirmed by the responses of those surveyed. 
About three-quarters of these clients indicated that they would be willing to use deposit facilities if 
offered to them (Table 7, item 6). Interestingly, there are no major distinctions among clients in 
rural and urban areas or across the clienteles of the five organizations in terms of their interest in 
deposit facilities. This reinforces the view that the limited holdings of deposits observed in rural 
areas reflect supply constraints, not lack of demand. Only the clients of FIE expressed 
comparatively less interest in deposit facilities (68 percent compared to 73-75 percent for the other 
four organizations). These responses, however, must be interpreted with caution. There may be a 
temptation for clients to offer answers that they may think would please interviewers. Whether a 
client will actually use such a service if offered depends on many factors including the price of the 
service and the transaction costs of using it. 
Dollarization 
Given past experience with hyperinflation in Bolivia, it is not surprising that the currency 
preferred by clients with actual holdings of cash and deposits are US dollars rather than bolivianos, 
particularly in urban areas (Table 7, item 4). Dollars are preferred by 62 to 74 percent of the urban 
clients and by 44 to 49 percent of the rural clients who reported holding financial savings. This 
preference for dollars was reported in similar proportions by those who considered the possibility 
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of depositing in the future if these facilities were offered (Table 7, item 5). The lower preference for 
dollars expressed by rural clients may indicate that it is not as easy to convert dollars to bolivianos 
in the countryside as in the city, thus making dollars less liquid in rural areas. 
Proximity to banks 
Questions were asked about the proximity of bank branches and of the offices of micro-
finance organizations to the client's home or workplace to determine if transaction costs (including 
travel time and travel costs) might affect selection of an organization. The survey reflects the more 
developed banking infrastructure found in urban over rural areas. 
A higher proportion of FIE clients know a bank branch that they consider close to their place 
of business ( 45 percent) or their residence (29 percent) than do clients of the other organizations 
(Table 8, item 1).54 The situation is intermediate for the clients ofCaja Los Andes, where 39 percent 
know a bank branch that is close to their business and 13 percent said that a bank branch is close to 
their residence. These proportions are lower for BancoSol clients, among whom 31 percent know 
another bank's branch close to their business and 13 percent find another bank's branch close to their 
residence. 
It would seem that residences are usually on the outskirts, away from the branches, and that 
businesses tend to be concentrated (in market areas or special streets) and that bank branches are 
wisely located where the businesses are. In rural areas, bank branches are close to the business or 
residence for 11-13 percent of PRODEM clients, while this is the case for only 6-7 percent of 
Sartawi clients (Table 8, item 1). This reflects the less developed banking network and less con-
centrated population of the rural areas ofBolivia. 
Proximity to the microfinance organizations 
In general, both the business and the residence of the client are closer to the office of a 
micro finance organization than to a bank branch. This locational advantage of the micro finance 
organization is particularly pronounced in rural areas.55 When this is the case, the borrower's 
transaction costs are reduced by proximity (Ladman, 1984). 
Indeed, a high proportion of the clients considered that the office of the microfinance 
organization from which they now receive loans is close to their business. This is true for 58 percent 
ofBancoSol clients, 55 percent of the clients ofPRODEM and Caja Los Andes, 46 percent of FIE 
54 
55 
BancoSol branches were not defined as bank branches for the present purposes. 
This inference is made by comparing in Table 8 the proportions of clients who indicated that 
a bank branch is close to the business or residence (item 1) and the proportions of clients 
who considered that a micro finance organization is close (items 3 and 4). 
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clients, and 38 percent ofSartawi clients (Table 8, item 3).56 During the field work the interviewers 
confirmed that PRODEM and Sartawi clients Jctucill_y live anJ vvork farther rrom their orga.11izations 
than do urban clients. 
Clients reported that the office of the micro finance organization is closer to their business 
than to their residence in all five cases. In urban areas, proximity to the residence was reported by 
27 percent of the clients of Caja Los Andes, BancoSol, and FIE. In rural areas, proximity to the 
residence was reported by 46 percent ofPRODEM and 24 percent of Sartawi clients (Table 8, item 
4). These results suggest that it is generally less expensive for loan officers to visit their clients at 
their workplace than at their residence. Visits to the residence may constitute, however, an important 
element in the screening of potential borrowers because they may reveal information about house-
hold stability and wealth that is not available from simply visiting the place of business, especially 
if the borrower is a street vendor. 
Location and competition 
A location close to the client's business might provide a monopolistic advantage to a lender, 
but this is hardly the case in the urban areas included in the study. Caja Los Andes faces the most 
intense competition among these organizations. Of the clients of Caja Los Andes surveyed, 48 
percent reported that they have BancoSol branches close to their business, while 23 percent have FIE 
offices close to their business (Table 8, item 3 ). Furthermore, 29 percent of the clients of Caja Los 
Andes have BancoSol offices close to their residence (Table 8, item 4). The proximity of competing 
organizations creates considerable contestability in the market niche of this organization. 
Competition is also intense for FIE. Among its clients, 51 percent have businesses close to 
Banco Sol offices and 23 percent have businesses close to branches of Caja Los Andes. Also, 28 
percent of FIE clients have BancoSol branches close to their residence. Such potential competition 
was less frequent for BancoSol. Only 12 percent of its clients considered that the offices ofCaja Los 
Andes are close to their business and only 10 percent claimed that FIE offices are close to their 
business. Less than 5 percent of Banco Sol clients had offices of either Caja Los Andes or FIE close 
to their residence. 57 BancoSol not only possesses a locational advantage derived from a larger and 
56 
57 
This proximity refers, in each case, to the organization that granted the current outstanding 
loan of the client, which then led to inclusion in the sample. As Table 8 (item 3) shows, 
other microfinance organizations may also have offices close to a given client's business. 
It is even possible that a given client has loans from more than one organization. 
It is important to note that these figures did not result from the actual measurement of 
distances. Rather, they reflect the clients' subjective perceptions about the offices of these 
organizations being close or not. What close means in urban rather than rural areas may 
differ. These perceptions do, however, influence demands for financial services and the 
client's opinion about the quality of services. 
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denser network of branches, but some of its clients may not be able or willing to pledge the collateral 
required by other lenders. In this sense, there is less contestability in this portion of its market niche. 
Advanced BancoSol clients may be strongly attracted, however, by the individual loan transactions 
offered by other lenders. 
In most cases, the proportion of the clients of each organization who consider its offices to 
be close to their business is higher than the proportion who find the offices of other organization to 
be close. The only exception is FIE, whose clients consider BancoSol branches to be close more 
frequently than they do find FIE's own offices to be close (Table 8, item 2). In generaL BancoSol 
branches are close to the business of its own clients more frequently (58 percent) than is true for Caja 
Los Andes (55 percent) or for FIE (46 percent). Indeed, BancoSol has more branches than the other 
two urban organizations, which increases the probability of proximity to both its own clients as well 
as clients of its competitors. 
The proximity of offices of other organizations, nevertheless, illustrates the intense competi-
tion that has developed among these urban programs, as their outreach expands and as prime markets 
may begin to be saturated. More intense competition has forced these organizations to improve the 
terms and conditions of their loan contracts and to explore potential additions to the services offered 
in order to prevent client desertions. One example of this has been BancoSol's willingness to 
experiment with individual loans in addition to the development of deposit facilities. Another 
example is the special treatment of preferred customer for its best clients by Caja Los Andes. Some 
of these efforts to sustain market shares by expanding portfolios in old locations may, however, 
increase risks of default, as loan-to-wealth ratios for existing clients increase and as marginal, riskier 
borrowers are incorporated into the portfolio. 
Competition appears to be less intense in rural areas. Only 19 percent of PROD EM clients 
consider the offices of Sartawi to be close to their business or their residence, while only 7-9 percent 
of Sartawi clients report having a PROD EM office close to their business or residence (Table 8, item 
2). These rates reflect the greater distances involved, while it is still likely that PRODEM and 
Sartawi may represent the closest options for the clients of either organization. If indeed this is the 
case, there may be more competition among them than suggested by subjective perceptions of 
proximity. 
Proximity, the available infrastructure, and poverty influence the means used for reaching 
the microfinance organization. Clients walk to their microfinance organization in 14 percent 
(Sartawi) to 42 percent (FIE) ofthe cases. Most of the other borrowers use public transportation 
(Table 8, itei:n 2). It is logical to expect a tendency to select the organization located closest to the 
client's business or residence. Given the longer distances that Sartawi clients must typically travel 
from their communities of residence to where the financial transactions take place, it is not surprising 
that 83 percent of them use public transportation. Only 14 percent of Sartawi clients reach the 
branch on foot compared to 34 percent of PROD EM clients. This may reflect a greater depth of 
outreach of Sartawi into remote rural communities, at least in the areas of the study. In urban areas, 
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public transportation is most frequently used by clients of Caja Los Andes (69 percent), less 
frequently by BancoSol clients (59 percent), and least frequently by FIE clients (55 percent). 
Sources of credit at the time of the .first loan 
Improved access to financial services is an important potential impact of the broadening 
outreach of these five organizations. To gain insights into this question clients were asked to 
identify the sources of loans, if any, they had at the time when they received their first loan from 
their current micro finance organization. It turns out that they had previously had very limited access 
to formal financial institutions. This is not a surprising result, considering the strict collateral 
requirements of banks and the clients' lack of accounting records to signal their creditworthiness to 
formal lenders (Sanchez, 1996). 
Some of the borrowers, however, had received loans from other NGOs, and a few had 
obtained loans from one of the other four micro finance organizations studied here and had shifted 
from one lender to the other. Previous access to NGO loans had been particularly frequent in rural 
areas. Participation in informal financial transactions at the time of their first micro finance loan had 
been more frequent than access to formal financial services, especially in rural areas. 
Prior borrowing with banks had been limited. Only 2 percent of BancoSol clients had 
obtained bank loans at about the time they received their first BancoSol transaction (Table 7, item 
7).58 This proportion is even lower (around 1 percent) for the clients of the other organizations and 
no PRODEM client in the sample had received bank loans at the time of their first transaction with 
PRODEM.59 
A few BancoSol (1.7 percent) and FIE clients (1.1 percent) had received loans from savings 
and loans associations.60 A few FIE (3.2 percent), Sartawi (2.3 percent), and BancoSol clients (2.1 
percent) had obtained loans from cooperatives. Although these proportions are all low, it seems that 
slightly more clients of FIE, Banco Sol, and Sartawi had had prior contacts with formal financial 
intermediaries than had clients ofCaja Los Andes and of PROD EM. The reasons for this differential 
58 
59 
60 
This question did not address whether the current microfinance clients had ever received 
formal bank loans before, just whether they had bank loans at about the time of their first 
microfinance loan. 
This limited access to bank loans is widespread but appears to be particularly acute among 
the clients of these organizations. A survey by other researchers of 111 small and micro-
enterprises in La Paz found that only 9 percent had access to bank loans and 1 percent had 
loans from savings and loan associations (Hannig et al., 1994). 
The most likely contact with formal financial institutions is for housing loans. 
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prior experience \Vith formal finance are not clear, but in all cases access to formal intermediaries 
had been minimal. 
Prior credit experience with other N GOs was somewhat more common than with formal 
financial institutions. At about the time they received their first loan from their current microfinance 
organization, about 8 percent of the clients of Caja Los Andes, 5 percent of FIE clients, and .f percent 
of BancoSol clients had received other NGO loans (Table 7, item 7). Prior NGO credit had been 
even more usual in rural areas. Almost one-fifth ofPRODEM and Sartawi clients had received loans 
from other NGOs at the time of their first loan with their current lender. 
Given the non-market loan terms used by many NGOs, in particular their subsidized interest 
rates, these earlier contacts were not necessarily good preparation for the stricter credit discipline 
employed by the organizations studied here. Most likely, clients ofPRODEM and ofSartawi shifted 
to the new lenders. despite the subsidized terms of their original sources of loans, in search for more 
reliable and permanent sources of credit. The continued operation of some rural NGOs that provide 
subsidized credit forces the microfinance organizations studied here to compensate for this 
marketing disadvantage with a higher quality of services. Loan contract attributes that might have 
attracted the borrowers to these new lenders, in all five cases, included larger loan sizes, longer terms 
to maturity, and the lower transaction costs associated with the speedy and reliable disbursement of 
funds. 
One of the most interesting observations is the proportion of clients who report having 
received loans with one of the other four organizations at about the time they received their first loan 
from their current lender. In the case of clients of Caja Los Andes, 17 percent already had obtained 
loans from BancoSol, 5 percent had received loans from FIE, and 3 percent had been granted loans 
from PRODEM (Table 7, item 7). In the case of FIE clients, 7 percent already had received loans 
from BancoSol, 4 percent from PROCREDITO before its transformation into Caja Los Andes, and 
4 percent from PROD EM. The proportions of Banco Sol clients who had been granted loans from 
FIE (1.3 percent) or Caja Los Andes (0.8 percent) are much lower. 
These figures suggest that competition has provoked a shift of clients away from BancoSol, 
despite its locational advantages and its wider network of branches. The most likely reasons for the 
transfer are client preferences for individual over group loans, the larger loan sizes, and the lower 
interest rates that accompany the more strict guarantee requirements of FIE or Caja Los Andes. If 
indeed this is the case, BancoSol is performing a valuable screening function for the other two 
organizations and it is generating, in the process, a positive externality. 
In summary, the proportions of clients who shifted to Caja Los Andes and FIE are compara-
tively high, in contrast to the current BancoSol clients who came from the competitors among this 
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group of organizations.61 There appear to be a greater number of reasons, therefore, why clients 
eventually leave BancoSol for other organizations than for movement in the opposite direction. As 
indicated, among the reasons for leaving BancoSol may be a desire for individual rather than group 
loans or for lower interest rates if the client can pledge the guarantees required. These clients of Caja 
Los Andes and of FIE may have thus revealed a preference for individual loans once they were able 
to meet the collateral and other conditions required to obtain them. In contrast, unless they have a 
strong dissatisfaction with the quality of services, the clients of FIE and Caja Los .Andes would have 
little reason to switch to a group credit scheme, once they have gained access to individual loans. 
From this perspective, individual lending dominates group credit. 
The current clients of Caja Los Andes or FIE could have borrowed from PROD EM before 
BancoSol was created. One possible reason for shifting from PRODEM is again the perceived 
superiority of individual over group loans. Therefore, by adding together the frequencies reported 
for earlier loans with BancoSol and/or with PRODEM, some idea can be obtained of the number of 
clients who shifted from group to individual borrowing. This appears to be the case for 20 percent 
ofthe clients ofCaja Los Andes and 11 percent of FIE clients. These shifts are an increasing threat 
for BancoSol, as long as its clients make sufficient progress and are able to offer the guarantees 
required for individual loans. Offering individual loans as a response to this threat is, in tum, a 
difficult challenge for this bank. 
At about the time of their first loan only a low proportion ofPRODEM and Sartawi clients 
had obtained loans from any of the other organizations studied (Table 7, item 7). A few PRODEM 
clients (2.7 percent) had received loans from Sartawi and a few Sartawi clients (1.2 percent) had 
received loans from PROCREDITO (now Caja Los Andes). A much higher proportion of these rural 
clients ( 18-19 percent) had obtained loans from other N GOs. 
At the time the clients received their first loan from their current microfinance organization, 
moneylenders had supplied loans to roughly 11 percent of FIE and BancoSol clients, and 8 percent 
of clients ofCaja Los Andes (Table 7, item 7).62 Surprisingly, these proportions are only about half 
as high in rural areas than in urban areas. Credit from moneylenders is expensive and may be used 
only sporadically, mostly for emergencies. 
The most frequent sources of credit at the time the clients received their first loan were 
friends and relatives andpasanakus. About one-fourth of urban clients reported loans from relatives: 
30 percent for BancoSol, 27 percent for Caja Los Andes, and 22 percent for FIE (Table 7, item 7). 
Over one-half of rural clients had had loans from relatives (53 percent). Loans from friends had been 
less frequent in urban areas (9 percent for Caja Los Andes and BancoSol and 3 percent for FIE 
61 
62 
The rapid expansion of the BancoSol portfolio is reflected by only 1.7 percent of its current 
clients in the sample who had started in the PRODEM days. 
This proportion was 12 percent of microenterprises in other survey (Hannig et al., 1994). 
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clients) than in rural areas (34 percent for PRODEM and 22 percent for Sartawi clients). Despite t.1e 
frequency of these arrangements, loans from friends and relatives are limited by the wealth 
constraints of these persons and by risk aversion in the presence of covariant cash flows and 
incomes. Thus, although access to informal sources of credit is frequent, the amounts involved are 
usually small (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995) 
Wealth and diversification constraints also limit the potential impact of pasanakus. At the 
time oftheir first loan with their current organization, 35 percent ofBancoSol clients had had loans 
from pasanakus, as had 27 percent of FIE clients and 18 percent of clients of Caja Los Andes (Table 
7, item 7).63 Surprisingly, pasanaku loans had been less frequent in rural areas: 12 percent for 
PROD EM and 8 percent for Sartawi clients. This may reflect the difficulty in meeting with a large 
group to make the frequent, very small transactions. as well as the difficulty of saving regularly as 
required for participating in pasanakus. 
Multiple current loans 
Some ofthe clients of the five microfinance organizations continued to borrow from multiple 
sources during 1995. Some of these loans might have been received earlier in the year by first-time 
borrowers. In other cases, the clients may have borrowed from one of the five organizations while 
borrowing from other sources simultaneously. Some formal loans might have been obtained for 
specialized purposes such as housing. A few clients reported loans from banks (BancoSol, FIE), 
cooperatives (BancoSol, PRODEM, Sartawi), and savings and loan associations (Caja Los Andes, 
FIE, Sartawi) received in 1995 (Table 7, item 8).64 One possibility, for which there was no evidence 
one way or the other, is that being a client in good standing of any of the (urban) organizations has 
a reputation value with other lenders. The only significant case of borrowing from other NGOs was 
reported by 8 percent of PROD EM clients. 
A few cases of clients in one organization borrowing from one or more of the other four 
organizations studied were reported. The most frequent cases are 9 percent of clients of Caja Los 
Andes who reported loans from BancoSol during 1995, and BancoSol clients (5 percent) who 
reported loans from Caja Los Andes (Table 7, item 8). This again suggests the existence of intense 
competition between these two organizations in at least partly overlapping market niches. Multiple 
loans may also suggest the need for borrowers to find second loans when they encounter loan-size 
rationing, as may be the case at Caja Los Andes as well as at BancoSol. Given the fragility of the 
loan guarantees used and the high rates of interest charged, lenders may prefer to grant loans for 
63 
64 
This proportion was 35 percent ofmicroenterprises in other survey (Hannig et al., 1994). 
BancoSol clients appear to have, in general, slightly more experience with formal finance 
than clients of the other organizations. No explanation for this anomaly was apparent, since 
most of the other indicators point to BancoSol having a relatively poorer clientele. 
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amounts smaller than the full repayment capacity of the clients would allow and that do not fully 
satisfy the client's demand. 
In all these cases of multiple loans, the frequency of access to other sources of loans is less 
than was observed at the time of the first loan with the organization. The apparent reduction in 
borrowing from other sources compared to the time of the first loan is particularly noticeable when 
earlier loans came from moneylenders and other NGOs. This suggests that these microfinance 
organizations provide better overall service than the previous lenders and so most clients have 
terminated their relationships with their previous sources of credit. This implies, in turn, an 
improvement in the welfare of these household-enterprises. 
Several loan transactions with informal sources were observed during 1995 (Table 7, item 
8). Loans from relatives are less frequent in urban areas (13-15 percent) than in rural areas (35-38 
percent). Loans from friends are also less frequent in urban areas (2-8 percent) than in rural areas 
(7 -16 percent). This interesting result suggests that informal markets are relatively better substitutes 
for formal markets in rural areas than they are in urban areas. This may reflect the comparative 
information and contract enforcement advantages resulting from close ties between friends and 
neighbors in rural areas, which allow them to lend at low cost. Moreover, formal lenders face major 
information problems in rural areas, which result in too high costs of lending for them. The supply 
of formal loans is thus inadequate and rural household-enterprises have no alternative but to resort 
to informal loans. If indeed this is the case, the micro finance organizations lending in rural areas 
constitute a major innovation in expanding the frontier of finance. 
As was the case with formal loans, the frequency of informal borrowing was lower in 1995 
relative to the time of the first loan from the current micro finance organization. In rural areas, the 
reduction is more noticeable with respect to loans from friends than to loans from relatives. Despite 
access to loans from microfinance organizations, however, loans from relatives continue to be an 
important source of credit for about 15 percent of urban and 35 percent of rural clients (Table 7, item 
8). 
Loans from moneylenders were also substantially less frequent in 1995 compared to the time 
of the first loan from the organization. Pasanaku participation was also less frequent than at the time 
of the first loan except for PRODEM clients. Among the clients of BancoSol, 22 percent still 
participate inpasanakus compared to 14 percent of FIE and PRODEM clients and 10 percent of 
clients of Caja Los Andes. No pasanaku participation was reported among the clients of Sartawi for 
1995 (Table 7, item 8). 
These data do not provide conclusive evidence about the impact of these microfinance 
organizations because many factors could explain the decline in borrowing from other sources 
between the time of the first loan and 1995. The results are consistent, however, with the argument 
that participation in these five organizations has provided their clients with reliable access to loans 
so they could reduce their borrowing from other sources. A number of different attributes of the 
organizations (e.g., permanency, less binding wealth constraints) and of the loan contracts (lower 
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total costs of borrowing including bott~ interest rates and transaction costs) may explain the clients' 
preference over earlier sources of credit. If indeed this is true, improved access to credit represents 
a significant impact associated with the development of microfinance in Bolivia. 
VII. Client Attitudes 
To evaluate the quality of outreach of these microfinance organizations, the survey attempted 
to identify areas of greater or lesser client satisfaction. The results must be interpreted with caution 
because ofthe well-kno\Vn difficulties in survey research of communicating a uniform understanding 
among the interviewees about the meaning and intent of the questions asked, and in the interpretation 
and recording of their subjective opinions. Nevertheless, the results seem to reveal a high level of 
overall satisfaction among the clients of these organizations. 65 
Information about the program 
The clients were asked to identify how they heard about the program in which they currently 
are clients. Most learned about the program from friends and relatives and other acquaintances who 
were already clients. This is true for 92 percent of BancoSol and 85 percent of PROD EM clients 
(Table 9, item 1). Created earlier, these two organizations appear to have been able to establish the 
most widely-held name recognition among this set of programs. Among the clients of Caja Los 
Andes, FIE, and Sartawi, 78-79 percent learned about the programs from friends and relatives. 
These are very high proportions as well. 
Word-of-mouth communications about the program substantially reduce advertisement costs. 
In urban areas, except in the case of Caja Los Andes, posters, written ads, and radio and television 
announcements are not frequently cited as a source of information by the clients. Even for Caja Los 
Andes, the proportion is still low relative to other means of information. Posters are somewhat 
important in rural areas, but for only 6-7 percent of the clients. This raises questions about the cost-
effectiveness of these efforts, although such public announcements may become more important in 
the future as competition increases among the programs operating in urban areas. 
The second most effective source of information about the programs are the loan officers. 
This is especially true for Sartawi clients (13 percent) because the loan officers visit communities 
seeking prospective clients (Table 9, item 1). The role ofloan officers in marketing the program is 
also important for clients ofCaja Los Andes and PRODEM (11 percent). In the case ofBancoSol, 
however, only 5 percent of the clients learned about the program from loan officers. This may 
65 Because there is no benchmark for the comparison, it is difficult to assess how high is a 
"high" level of satisfaction. The researchers' casual observations detected strong positive 
feelings among the clients. The self-selection bias implicit in the sampling procedure may 
also influence these results. Clients who had left a program (drop-outs) because they were 
unhappy were not interviewed. 
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reflect the dynamics of group formation in which clients first seek each other to participate in the 
program. Thus, potential clients induce other group members to join them in a loan application 
before they even meet the loan officer. This represents a potentially cost-saving delegation of 
signaling and screening functions to group members. 
An important implication of these findings is that most information about the programs 
comes from the clients themselves. This could have negative consequences on the demand for an 
organization's services if the clients were not generally satisfied, at least in contrast with other 
funding alternatives available to them. Casual observations by the researchers suggested a high 
degree of pride among the customers about their relationship with their current organization. The 
development of long-term client-organization relationships contributes to this client loyalty which, 
in tum, is critical to keep arrears low (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
These positive attitudes and critical incentives are reinforced by the persistence with which 
these programs communicate to their clients the importance of developing a long-term client-
organization relationship. At the same time, these communications with clients also emphasize the 
lender's firmness regarding loan collection and the borrower's responsibility to repay. Moreover, 
potential borrowers learn from current clients about the discipline required and about the determina-
tion of the organization to enforce repayment. This commitment to collecting loans helps to destroy 
images of subsidy and paternalism. These images are often common among the beneficiaries of 
other NGO programs, and they destroy a culture of repayment. The message of discipline issued by 
these organizations helps create an appropriate structure of incentives to repay for the borrowers as 
of the first contact with the organization (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1996). 
Larger loan sizes 
The clientele of the five microfinance organizations studied typically would find it very 
difficult to access the financial services of formal intermediaries, particularly loans. They do engage 
in informal financial transactions with friends and relatives and some continue to participate in 
informal financial markets, but the terms and conditions of moneylenders are frequently onerous and 
the features of pasanakus are often restrictive. Therefore, although the terms and conditions ofloans 
from these microfmance organizations are stiff, as they must be to allow the microfinance programs 
to cover their costs and risks, there is substantial demand for their loans. The survey attempted to 
discover what features of the organizations and of their products were most attractive to clients 
compared to their earlier options. The responses revealed that two features stood out in the opinions 
of the clients: the ability to obtain larger loans (to borrow more) and the simplicity of guarantee 
requirements. 
As shown in Table 9 (item 2), the opportunity to get a larger loan had been particularly 
attractive for PROD EM clients (86 percent). This may reflect both PROD EM's willingness to make 
larger loans (compared to Sartawi) and the more binding wealth and portfolio diversification 
constraints that limit the supply of informal fmance and of other N GO loans in rural areas compared 
to urban areas. Potential access to larger loans had been an important feature valued by about one-
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half of the clients of the other four organizations. It was found to be attractive less frequently to FIE 
clients ( 44 percent) than to others. Given that FIE loans are on average the largest this may 
reinforce the hypothesis that FIE clients tend to be the least poor of the borrowers of these five 
organizations. That is. even before borrowing from FIE, its clients might have been less credit-
constrained than those of the other four organizations. 
If borrowers are attracted to a particular source of loans because they can get larger loans, 
this may suggest that they are either credit-constrained or loan-size rationed by alternative sources 
of credit. Producers are credit-constrained if they have opportunities to use resources in projects 
with marginal rates of return that are higher than the going rates of interest, but cannot gain access 
to loans even if they are able and willing to repay them. This may reflect information and contract 
enforcement problems for the lenders who find it too costly to verify the producer's creditworthiness 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1996b ). Borrowers are loan-size rationed if they desire loans larger than what they 
are getting at the going rates of interest and are able and willing to repay these larger loans, but the 
lender limits the size of loan. Such loan-size rationing may reflect interest rate ceilings or the 
inability of lenders to screen potential borrowers by raising interest rates further because of moral 
hazard or adverse selection problems (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1987). 
If producers are credit-constrained or loan-size rationed, then profitable opportunities or 
valuable uses of funds will be missed due to lack of access to sufficient credit. In such cases, loans 
from these microfinance organizations can not only increase the productivity of the borrowers' 
enterprises and raise the welfare oftheir households, but also improve the allocation of resources in 
the economy (Gonzalez-Vega, 1996a). Evidence from the survey suggests that these organizations, 
while still engaging in some degree of loan-size rationing, are alleviating credit constraints for some 
poor household-enterprises. 
Easier guarantee requirements 
Information and contract enforcement problems induce lenders to require collateral in the 
form of physical assets about which there is sufficient information as a way to improve the 
probability of collecting their loans. Traditional forms of collateral tend to exclude the poor from 
access to formal loans, however, because the poor do not own the assets (e.g., real estate) that are 
acceptable to banks or because the costs of using the formal legal system for contract enforcement 
are too high given the small size of the loans (Gonzalez-Vega, 1996c). The most important 
contribution of the microfinance organizations studied has been the development of cost-effective 
lending technologies that do not rely on traditional forms of collateral. Their clients value this 
feature oftheir contracts greatly. 
Simple guarantee requirements were important in attracting 65 percent ofBancoSol clients 
(Table 9, item 2). This suggests that the borrowers of this organization are willing to incur the high 
transaction costs of group credit and to tolerate the rigidities of synchronous borrowing because they 
avoid the need to pledge physical assets as collateral for loans. They may be unable or unwilling 
to pledge assets other than their reputation and their willingness to screen and monitor their peers 
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in group loans. By borrowing from BancoSol a.r1d maintaining a good credit histor; they acquire the 
intangible asset represented by the present value of future loans, which they stand to lose if they 
default. This process results in the self-selection of clients who are attracted by the opportunity of 
obtaining access to credit tb.rough offering no more than joint liability for group loans. Indeed, 39 
percent of BancoSol clients explicitly identified group credit as a feature of these contracts that 
attracted them. Most likely, a good number ofthese borrowers could not or would not borrow from 
other of the microfinance organizations studied here because of the guarantees required for their 
loans. 
Simple guarantee requirements were attractive for 53 percent of Sartawi and 49 percent of 
PRODEM borrowers (Table 9, item 2). These two organizations also rely on group credit as the 
main mechanism to compensate for the absence of physical collateral. The clients of these 
organizations, however, did not find the group feature attractive as frequently as BancoSol clients 
did. Only 17 percent of Sartawi and 11 percent of PRODEM clients consider that group loans 
attracted them to the organization. This may reflect the higher transaction costs of group meetings 
and coordination and of peer monitoring in rural areas as compared to more densely populated urban 
areas where the infrastructure is better developed. Poor rural clients, however, may not have the 
same opportunities to shift to individual loans from other organizations as do the urban clients of 
BancoSol. The implication is that many BancoSol clients may not be able to borrow from other 
organizations because of the more strict collateral they require. This constraint may disappear as the 
wealth of some of these clients increases and as they accumulate physical assets. 
Simple guarantee requirements were attractive for 49 percent of the clients of Caja Los 
Andes, despite the fact that liens on goods are typically required by this lender (Table 9, item 2). 
This suggests that these forms of physical collateral are acceptable to the borrowers of this 
organization and that Caja Los Andes has been successful in keeping procedures simple enough to 
make this a valuable feature of its loan contracts. Simple guarantees were attractive to 32 percent 
of the clients ofFIE, the organization where this feature was less frequently mentioned as attractive 
to the clientele. This is surprising again, because FIE seems to be more flexible in the choice of 
guarantees and does not require joint liability from its borrowers. 
Lower interest rates 
Most of the clients of these micro finance organizations do not have access to loans from 
formal financial intermediaries, which lend at lower rates of interest. Instead, they may borrow at 
very high rates from moneylenders or obtain loans from friends and relatives which may impose 
burdensome reciprocal obligations on the borrower. Despite the relatively high interest rates charged 
by these microfinance programs, some borrowers seem to find these rates more attractive than those 
paid in informal markets. A few borrowers may also switch from one program to another in search 
of lower interest rates. 
The clients of FIE found the interest rates charged to be a valuable attribute of their loan 
contracts more frequently (56 percent) than did borrowers from the other organizations (Table 9, 
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item 2). The responses of Sartawi clients (38 percent) and of clients of Caja Los Andes (36 percent) 
also reflected the view that lower interest rates, compared to their earlier options, attracted them to 
the program. The clients ofBancoSol (28 percent) and ofPRODEM (15 percent) were attracted by 
the level of interest rates less frequently than were the clients of the other organizations. This is not 
surprising, as these two organizations charge higher interest rates than the others in order to cover 
their costs. These higher costs reflect the smaller size of their loans. 
Lower transaction costs 
Interest rates are only a portion of the total costs of borrowing (Gonzalez-Vega and 
Gonzalez-Garita, 1987). Borrower transaction costs arise from the steps required to secure a loan 
(Adams and Nehman, 1979). Simplicity of procedures reduces these transaction costs. About one 
third of the clients of these organizations were attracted by less red tape implied by their lending 
procedures (Table 9, item 2). They also valued the proximity of the offices of these organizations, 
particularly in the case of Caja Los Andes (18 percent), and the timeliness in disbursing the loans, 
especially in the case of Caja Los Andes as well (24 percent). 
In contrast, the clients ofPRODEM were attracted least frequently among the borrowers in 
the sample by the proximity of the offices and by the timeliness of disbursement. This is surprising 
because the clients of Sartawi appear to come from more distant communities than do the clients of 
PRODEM. Proximity to the office lowers the transaction costs resulting from visits to the branch, 
while timeliness reduces potential losses from lack of timely disbursement of the funds which may 
result in lost opportunities or lower yields (e.g., not being able to plant at the right time). 
Longer terms to maturity 
Most informal loans are very short term. It is not surprising, therefore, that some clients were 
attracted by the possibility of receiving longer term loans from these microfinance organizations 
even though these loans are still comparatively short term relative to formal loans from banking 
sources. The clients of FIE (31 percent) and Caja Los Andes (24 percent) valued this attribute of 
loan contracts more frequently (Table 9, item 2). This finding may reflect the greater proportion of 
manufacturing producers among the clientele of these organizations, while Banco Sol clients are 
heavily concentrated in trading where shorter terms may be consistent with the more rapid turnover 
of inventories. The clients of rural organizations did not find terms to maturity especially attractive. 
This is also interesting, because it highlights that rural activities have a longer gestation than many 
of the economic activities of urban clients. This suggests the possibility of an unsatisfied demand 
for longer term loans in rural areas, a situation being explored by PRODEM. 
Individual and group loans 
There is considerable debate in the microfinance field about the merits of group lending 
versus individual lending. From the perspective of the client, there are several theoretical reasons 
why individual loans may be superior to group loans. The terms and conditions of individual loans 
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(size, term to rnahL.'"ity, amortization schedule) can be tailored to closel v match the client's demand 
and the enterprise cash flows that make repayment possible. The timing of disbursement of 
individual loans can respond to the opportunities when the funds are needed. The borrower may 
choose not to borrow when there is no reason without fear of jeopardizing access to loans for other 
group members. In contrast, the inevitable rigidities that accompany group loans, due to the need 
for synchronous terms to maturity and repayment schedules, reduce the value of group loans. The 
obligations to participate in meetings, to be present for jointly signing contracts and receiving loan 
funds, and to monitor group members increase borrower transaction costs. 
Joint liability responsibilities usually associated with group loans introduce risks of losses 
from extra payments or from the cancellation of borrowing privileges when other group members 
do not repay. These contingencies are largely beyond the control of the borrower except for the 
ability to screen and monitor other group members. It is safe to assume that, ceteris paribus, 
borrowers will prefer individual loans. Thus, they will participate in group loans only if they have 
no access to individual loans (e.g, because they cannot pledge the collateral required by formal 
lenders) or if the other terms and conditions of the individual loans they have access to (e.g, money-
lenders) are sufficiently onerous to more than compensate for the costs and inconvenience of group 
loans. 
In contrast, there are conflicting theoretical reasons why lenders may prefer either group or 
individual loans. Group loans may reduce lender transaction costs and risks (Berenbach and 
Guzman, 1994; Stiglitz, 1990). Joint liability, however, does not guarantee repayment and it 
introduces conflicting incentives to repay (Besley and Coate, 1995; Chaves, 1996). Repayment 
depends on which incentives dominate in each case. Finally, organizations that grant individual 
loans may gain greater cost reductions from directly learning about the individual borrowers than 
group lenders can accomplish when their monitoring of individual borrowers is less intense (Schmidt 
and Zeitinger, 1996). 
The survey revealed that a high proportion of the clients of Caja Los Andes (59 percent) and 
of FIE (31 percent) were attracted to these organizations particularly by their offer of individual 
loans (Table 9, item 2). These organizations have been able to supply individual loans at average 
costs comparable to those ofBancoSol (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 1997). A few Sartawi borrowers were 
attracted by this feature. 
In contrast, those borrowers who indicated that they were attracted by group loans at 
BancoSol (39 percent), Sartawi (17 percent), and PRODEM (11 percent) were probably willing to 
incur the additional transaction costs of group credit because they could not or preferred not to offer 
the guarantees required for individual loans elsewhere (Table 9, item 2). Because it is unlikely that 
this decision would reflect strong demand-side preferences for group credit, a more plausible 
explanation is that some borrowers are locked into group credit rather than individual loans due to 
deficiencies of the supply of credit resulting from information and contract enforcement problems 
that cannot be overcome in a cost-effective fashion for individual loans. These issues are far from 
being resolved in theory or in practice. 
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Client satisfaction 
Overall client satisfaction with these microfinance organizations is high. Between 81 and 
99 percent of the clients are generally happy with their relationship with their current organization 
(Table 9, item 3). The sources of satisfaction differ from one organization to the other, and this fact 
probably explains why some clients seek the services of their current organization rather than those 
of an alternative source. 
There is probably a self-selection process that matches specific clients to particular organiza-
tions (Nagarajan eta!., 1995; Sanchez, 1996). This matching is determined, on the one hand, by the 
terms and conditions of the loan contracts offered by the organizations and, on the other hand, by 
the ability of the clients to signal their creditworthiness within the parameters of the lending 
teclmologies ofthe organizations. This matching may result in some degree of market fragmenta-
tion, with some organizations possessing comparative advantages in specific market niches. These 
considerations suggest that there may be some degree of differentiation of the typical market niches 
of the five organizations. Other observations from the survey, however, suggest that there are 
important ranges of overlapping of these market niches as well. 
Differences in market niches are reflected in differences in the specific sources of client 
satisfaction. As shown in Table 9 (item 3 ), the clients of BancoSol are more frequently satisfied 
with the joint liability guarantee requirements associated with group credit (94 percent) and with the 
terms to maturity of the loans (69 percent) than they are with the interest rates charged (55 percent) 
or the size of loans granted (54 percent). That this, they borrow from this organization mostly for 
the ability to do away with the need to pledge physical assets as collateral, but they find some other 
features of the lending teclmology constraining. 
It is interesting that as many as 55 percent of BancoSol clients are satisfied with the interest 
rates charged. This suggests that they are willing or have few options but to pay high interest rates 
if they do not want to pledge assets as collateral for their loans. The figures also suggests, however, 
that a good number of clients ( 45 percent) do not find the interest rates charged that attractive and 
that they rather see them merely as the high cost of gaining access to loans that they would not have 
otherwise. 
In turn, 46 percent of Banco Sol clients may not be that satisfied with loan sizes. This may 
reflect the extent to which some borrowers may still be loan-size rationed, despite their access to 
credit. It may also reflect discrepancies between borrower and lender about prudent amounts to lend 
given the possibility of moral hazard. The need to participate in a borrowing group that requires 
joint liability may also be an important constraint that prevents adjustment ofloan sizes to individual 
demands. This will happen even ifloan sizes differ among group members, because discrepancies 
in loan sizes that are too large tend to destroy incentives to continue borrowing as part of the 
heterogeneous group (Chaves, 1996). 
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As shown in Table 9 (item 3), the clients of Caja Los Andes are more frequently satisfied 
with the guarantee requirements (88 percent) and with the interest rates charged (74 percent) than 
they are with the terms to maturity of the loans (66 percent) and, particularly, vvith loan sizes (34 
percent). The low positive response for loan sizes may reflect both the consequences of liquidity 
constraints endured by Caja Los Andes during 1995, which resulted in loan-size rationing, as well 
as the more strict loan-size evaluation generally undertaken according to the lending technology of 
this organization. 
This observation tends to confirm the researchers' hypothesis that Caja Los Andes tmdertakes 
the most careful evaluation of individual creditworthiness (screening) among these organizations and 
that it uses the most conservative criteria in linking loan sizes to potential repayment capacity. Other 
organizations use more uniform and standard loan sizes, at least during the earlier repetitions along 
the sequence of transactions, and practice less detailed screening functions. It is interesting to note 
that the clients of Caja Los Andes are not that frequently satisfied with loans sizes in spite of the fact 
that the results reported in Table 6 (item 1) reveal that mean and median loan sizes for Caja Los 
Andes are second only to FIE. 
It is also interesting to note that a very high proportion of the borrowers of Caja Los Andes 
are satisfied with the Iien-on-goods-cum-garante collateral that is typical of these loans, most likely 
because this gives them the option to obtain individual rather than group loans. Although 
satisfaction with interest rates ranks second to satisfaction with guarantee requirements among the 
borrowers of Caja Los Andes, a higher proportion of them are satisfied with interest rates than 
among BancoSol clients. The opposite is true, however, for loan sizes. 
The clients of FIE are frequently satisfied with the guarantee requirements (79 percent), the 
interest rates charged (75 percent), and the terms to maturity ofthe loans (71 percent). Similar to 
what is true for the other urban organizations, they are less frequently satisfied with loan sizes ( 48 
percent). This may also reflect a similar lack of liquidity as reported for Caja Los Andes, which 
forced these organizations to limit the growth ofloan sizes and which acutely affected the operations 
of FIE during 1995. The situation was so serious that funds had to be advanced to the organization 
even by members of its board of directors. The more frequent satisfaction with guarantee 
requirements than with any other contract condition may reflect both a preference for individual 
loans and an understanding of the more strict collateral requirements ofbanks. 
The clients of PRODEM are more frequently satisfied with the joint liability guarantee 
requirements associated with group credit (97 percent) and with the terms to maturity of the loans 
(72 percent) than they are with the interest rates charged (61 percent) or the size of the loans granted 
(53 percent). The reasons for these perceptions are similar to those already discussed for BancoSol. 
Although lack of satisfaction with loan sizes seems to be universal, it was particularly true 
among Sartawi clients (31 percent). The lending technology of this organization does not allow any 
discretion in the determination of loan sizes. That is, given the limited screening performed, all 
borrowers at a particular stage of the sequence receive the same size ofloan. This ignores important 
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discrepancies in client demands and results in welfare losses from lack of adjustment to individual 
circumstances equivalent to those that result from group credit schemes. 
The clients of Sartawi are less frequently satisfied with the interest rates charged ( 61 percent) 
than with the guarantee requirements (91 percent) and the terms to maturity of the loans (69 percent). 
Less frequent satisfaction with interest rates may reflect a negative externality from other NGOs 
engaged in subsidized credit in the same regions. Similar responses about their satisfaction with 
terms to maturity from the clients of all five organizations tend to confirm the hypothesis that most 
of the demands for credit in these market niches are for short-term loans, even in rural areas. 
IX. Conclusions 
This paper presents and interprets simple descriptive statistics generated from data obtained 
in a survey of clients of five microfinance organizations widely believed to be among the best in 
Bolivia in terms of their outreach and sustainability. In a companion paper, Gonzalez-Vega et al. 
(1997) present a detailed comparative analysis of the performance of these organizations. 
The five lenders exhibit different combinations of organizational design, lending technology, 
and market area of operations. Two of them are regulated financial intermediaries offering both 
deposit and loan services: BancoSol is a private commercial bank and Caja Los Andes is a fonda 
jinanciero privado. Three of them (FIE, PRODEM, and Sartawi) are NGOs. Two operate in rural 
areas (PROD EM and Sartawi) while the other three operate largely in urban areas (BancoSol, FIE, 
and Caja Los Andes). Two offer their clients individual loans (Caja Los Andes and FIE) and three 
grant loans to individuals through joint liability groups (BancoSol, PRODEM, and Sartawi). 
The paper discusses household-enterprise profiles of a sample of 622 clients drawn at random 
from these five organizations. The paper also identifies differences in the terms and conditions of 
loan contracts with these organizations, and it assesses changes over time in the sources of loans 
obtained by the clients. 
The construction of socio-economic profiles of the clients makes it possible to evaluate the 
depth of outreach of these organizations, while the analysis of the terms and conditions of the loan 
contracts reveals the quality of their outreach. The paper does not attempt to measure impact on the 
clients of their access to loans from these organizations, except indirectly in terms of changes in their 
sources of credit from the time of their first loan with the organization. 
The interpretation of the statistics seeks to establish connections between key characteristics 
ofthe clients and features of the lending technologies used by the organizations. Different types of 
clients find that the terms and conditions of the loan contracts associated with each lending 
technology are more or less appropriate for their own circumstances. These different degrees of 
appropriateness lead to the matching of specific classes of borrowers with particular organizations 
and influence the determination of the market niches where the lenders possess comparative 
advantages. 
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The construction of client profiles on the basis of survey data helps to sketch the boundaries 
of these market niches and to establish the extent to which these market niches overlap or are dif-
ferentiated. In turn, the specific identification of their market niches permits an assessment of 
potential competition among these organizations. 
Data on loan sizes suggest the existence of different but broadly overlapping market niches 
associated, in turn, with three identifiable tiers of clients. The first tier includes the urban clients of 
FIE and Caja Los Andes, who receive larger loans and at longer terms to maturity. The second tier 
is associated with the clients of BancoSol, who generally receive smaller loans at shorter terms to 
maturity. The third tier represents the rural clients of PROD EM and Sartawi, who receive still 
smaller loans. The sharpest distinction is between, on the one hand, the clients of the three urban 
organizations and, on the other, those of the two rural organizations. Smaller loan sizes contribute 
to the higher costs of lending in rural areas. 
Different credit products correspond, in turn, to different types of clients. The resulting 
matching between clients and organizations reflects a weak but positive correlation between levels 
of poverty and loan sizes, as reported in Navajas et al. (1996) for the same sample of clients. 
According to an index ofbasic needs fulfillment of their clients, these organizations can be ranked 
as follows: FIE. Caja Los Andes, BancoSol, and PRODEM and Sartawi (which are almost identical 
in this respect). The exact same ranking is essentially obtained when the clients are ordered 
according to loan size. The same ranking is also obtained when the clients are ordered according 
to the ratio of loan size to the value of sales and according to the value of their monthly sales, except 
that in this case the clients of Caja Los Andes are ranked ahead of the clients of FIE. This ranking 
reversal reflects the more conservative screening criteria of Caja Los Andes. 
The three tiers of clients are also associated with different socio-economic features of their 
household-enterprises. As one moves from the first to the third tier, levels of education decline, size 
ofhousehold increases, the number of rooms per household member in the residence declines, access 
to electricity, water supplies, and sewage facilities declines, and home ownership declines. These 
household features coincide with increasing levels of poverty as one moves from the first to the third 
tier (Navajas et al., 1996) .. 
As one moves from the first to the third tier, the employment-generating capacity of the 
enterprise declines (except for Banco Sol, where it is lowest), their informality increases, there is less 
separation of household and enterprise accounts and cash flows, the proportion of borrowers with 
multiple occupations decreases, and the proportion of clients engaged in trading increases. For 
BancoSol clients, the proportion of heads of household is lower and the proportion of women in the 
portfolio is higher than for all other organizations. The development of lending technologies that 
do not rely on standard financial statements and on collateralizable assets is a formidable innovation 
that explains the outreach and sustainability results of these organizations. 
The concentration of women in the portfolio of BancoSol and, to some extent Caja Los 
Andes, reflects the concentration of women in trading, which allows them to generate the cash flows 
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needed for frequent loan payments. These frequent payments reflect, in tum, the need to closely 
monitor borrower behavior when no traditional collateral is used. The concentration ofBancoSol's 
portfolio in trading may also reflect fewer difficulties in forming borrowing groups among traders 
than among other types of producers. The evidence also suggests that some Banco Sol clients tend 
to shift to the individual loans of other organizations as soon as they accumulate enough assets and 
reach income levels that meet the creditworthiness standards required for individual loans .. 
Differences in the guarantees required for loans appear to dominate distinctions in loan terms 
and conditions. Despite these di:tierences in lending technology and guarantees required, however, 
all of these organizations adhere to basic principles that contribute to their success in outreach and 
sustainability. Joint liability seems to be appropriate for very poor people, but many group 
borrowers eventually outgrow this relationship. Despite some subsidy dependence, Caja Los Andes 
and FIE have shown, in turn, that it is possible to supply individual loans to poor people and still be 
profitable. Caja Los Andes appears to apply more strict lending criteria than the other four organi-
zations. Trade-offs bet\veen loan size, interest rates, and guarantee requirements are evident and 
different combinations of terms and conditions attract different subsets of the clientele. These 
combinations result in some product differentiation in the overlapping market niches served by these 
organizations. 
Most clients are quite satisfied with the services received. The lowest frequency of satisfied 
responses concerns loan sizes. Apparently many clients believe that they can effectively manage 
larger loans than they are now receiving. This is not a surprising conclusion because borrowers 
generally are more confident about their prospects than are their lenders, but the data also suggests 
that loan-size rationing is widespread. The liquidity constraints experienced by some of these 
organizations in 1995 may have slowed down loan size growth more than prudent lending would 
have dictated. At least in the urban areas, increasing competition in the microfinance field will force 
these organizations to continue improving the quality of their services for the benefit of their most 
creditworthy clients. Adjusting loan sizes to client demands appears to be an important factor in 
retaining some of the best clients. 
Finally, all of these organizations are expanding the frontier of microfinance. They are 
demonstrating that microfinance lending is feasible and potentially profitable on a large scale for 
poor clients. They have shown that it is possible to develop lending technologies that reach a much 
poorer clientele than is typically reached by traditional collateral-based lenders. Importantly, 
through close relations with their clients, an adequate structure of compatible incentives, and an 
effective management of arrears, these organizations are able to achieve high rates of loan recovery 
and, so far, have avoided the serious loan delinquency and default problems that destroyed many 
specialized lending institutions in developing countries. This is a formidable achievement in a very 
poor country with a long history of bank credit delinquencies. 
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ANNEX 
Table 1. Bolivia: Sample of Microi1nance Organization Clients, by Location. 1995. 
Program/Location Number of Population Original Number of Proportion of 
Branchesa of Clients" Sampleb Interviewsc Populationct 
Caja Los Andes 
La Paz ,., 6J79 92 86 1.4 ~ 
El Alto 2 3,065 46 42 1.4 
Total 5 9,244 138 128 1.4 
Banco Sol 
LaPaz 7 19,475 175 175 0.9 
El Alto~ 4 10,540 84 64 0.6 
Totale 11 30,015 259 239 0.8 
FIE 
La Paz 2 3.382 61 59 1.7 
El Alto 2 2,139 38 36 1.7 
Total 4 5,521 99 95 1.7 
PROD EM 
Altiplano ,., 2,480 89 74 3.0 .) 
Sartawi 
El Alto 967 14 1 0.1 
Altiplano 3 3,962 74 85 2.1 
Total 4 4,929 88 86 1.7 
Total 28 52,189 673 622 1.2 
a Number of branches and of clients in the area of the study only. 
b Number of clients selected for the sample, not taking into account replacements. 
c Refers to client interviews only. See Table 2 for both client and loan officer interviews. 
d Percentage of interviews completed to the branches' population of clients. 
e A total of 96 clients from 5 branches in El Also were originally selected, but the Alto Lima 
branch had to be excluded because of a pilot project reorganization at this branch. 
Table 2. Bolivia: Number of Observations in Survey of Clients of 
Microfinance Organizations. 1995. 
Program Both Client and Only Loan Officer Total 
Loan Officer Interview 
Interview 
Caja Los Andes 128 13 141 
BancoSol 239 20 259 
FIE 95 20 115 
PROD EM 74 5 79 
Sartawi 863 14 100 
TOTAL 622 72 694 
a One loan officer interview is missing. 
Table 3. Bolivia: Characteristics of Clients in the Sample, 1995. 
Item Andes Banco Sol FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
1. Age (years): 
Average 38 39 38 35 43 
Median 36 38 36 33 43 
2. Age (percent): 
Less than 25 years 4 7 4 1 l 7 
25 to less than 35 years 33 27 34 43 21 
3 5 to less than 45 years 38 40 36 30 26 
45 years and older 25 26 26 16 47 
..., Women (percent) 6:2 78 44 32 27 .). 
4. Client is head of household (percent): 
Among all clients 52 42 72 74 79 
Among women clients 18 26 18 7 13 
5. Education level of the client (percent): 
No schooling 6 8 1 14 14 
Up to grades 1 - 3 13 25 9 20 19 
Up to grades 4- 8 40 ...,..., 30 41 40 .).) 
Up to grades 9- 12 30 31 45 22 26 
Beyond grade 12 11 3 16 4 2 
6. Education level of the client (cumulative; 
percent): 
No schooling 6 8 1 14 14 
Grade 3 or less 19 "'"' 10 34 33 .).) 
Grade 8 or less 59 66 40 75 73 
Grade 12 or less 89 97 85 97 99 
Beyond grade 12 or less 100 100 100 100 100 
7. Education level of women (percent): 
No schooling 9 ll 2 26 26 
Grade 3 or less 16 28 15 38 35 
Grade 8 or less 41 34 27 "'"' 26 _,) 
Grade 12 or less 28 26 41 4 13 
Beyond grade 12 or less 6 2 15 0 0 
8. Education level of men (percent): 
No schooling 2 0 0 8 10 
Grade 3 or less 8 17 4 12 13 
Grade 8 or less 39 28 32 44 44 
Grade 12 or less 33 49 47 30 31 
Beyond grade 12 or less 18 6 17 6 "' ) 
9. Household size (percent): 
1 - 4 persons 25 22 32 24 21 
5-8 persons 67 69 63 72 65 
9 - 15 persons 8 9 5 4 14 
(Cont.) 
Table 3. Bolivia: Characteristics of Clients in the Sample, 1995. (Cont.) 
Item Andes BancoSol FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
10. Household members employed (percent): 
Only 1 person 0 I 3 0 0 
2 persons 16 18 26 22 20 
3 to 5 persons 79 78 71 77 69 
6 and more persons 5 3 0 1 12 
ll. Household members employed 
(cumulative; percent): 
At least 1 100 100 100 100 100 
At least 2 100 99 97 100 100 
At least 3 to 5 84 81 71 78 81 
At least 6 or more 5 .., 0 1 12 .) 
12. Client is originally from this area (percent) 65 66 64 85 72 
13. Average number of years lived by client in 
this area 24 22 19 17 25 
14. Client owns land in rural areas (percent) 18 16 19 81 79 
Table 4. Bolivia: Residence of Clients in the Sample, 1995. 
Item Andes BancoSol FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
1. Type of dwelling (percent): 
Independent home 48 41 39 85 62 
Apartment in building 8 8 17 0 0 
Room in collective housing 42 49 43 14 34 
Other 2 2 1 1 5 
2. Average number of rooms 
per residence 1.95 1.75 2.05 1.62 1.94 
3. Residence is (percent): 
Owned 58 49 51 88 84 
Rented 11 21 12 1 2 
Pawned (anticretico) 5 8 13 3 0 
Used free of charge 25 22 25 8 14 
4. Dwelling has (percent): 
Running water 91 84 92 43 47 
Electricity 96 95 99 64 62 
Sewer 76 57 74 8 6 
Table 5. Bolivia: Client Occupation and Microenterprise Characteristics in the 
Sample, 1995. 
Item Andes BancoSol FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
I. Principal occupation of client (percent): 
Production (manufacturing or agriculture) 39 20 49 41 53 
Trade 49 63 ""' 50 28 .).) 
Services 12 17 18 9 19 
2. Principal occupation of women (percent): 
Production (manufacturing or agriculture) ?., _ _, 15 26 42 43 
Trade 67 T"J 57 58 57 
Services 10 13 17 0 0 
3. Principal occupation of men (percent): 
Production (manufacturing or agriculture) 65 38 68 40 57 
Trade 20 ""') .)_ 13 46 17 
Services 14 30 19 14 25 
4. The borrower has multiple occupations 
(percent) 68 49 65 73 82 
5. Secondary occupation of client (percent): 
Production (manufacturing or agriculture) 15 9 9 15 28 
Trade 41 20 45 43 48 
Services 13 19 11 15 13 
Does not have 32 51 35 27 12 
6. The client is a trader and the products 
marketed are (percent): 
Own production 53 35 68 57 74 
Foreign goods 35 40 26 10 4 
Domestically-produced goods 71 78 55 61 64 
7. The business is separated from the 
household (percent): 
Among all clients 47 44 52 32 34 
Among women clients 48 42 52 ..,.., .).) 43 
Among men clients 45 49 51 32 30 
8. Type of accounting system used by client 
(percent): 
Uses accountant 2 -a 4 0 0 
Simple income and expense records 47 37 54 16 24 
No written records 52 63 42 84 76 
9. Type of accounting system used by 
women (percent): 
Uses accountant 1 0 7 0 0 
Simple income and expense records 47 34 55 17 22 
No written records 52 66 38 83 78 
(Cont.) 
Table 5. Bolivia: Client Occupation and Microente:rprise Characteristics in the 
Sample, 1995. (cont.) 
Andes BancoSol FIE PRODEM Sartawi 
10. Average number of workers besides the 
borrower:b 
Permanent workers 2.4 ..., ") _ ..) 2.6 1.0 1.3 
Temporary workers 2.2 2.2 5.0 3.8 1.4 
Relatives without explicit remuneration 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 2.2 
11. Average number of workers besides the 
borrower:c 
Permanent workers 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.1 
Temporary workers 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.4 
Relatives without explicit remuneration 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.2 
Total 2.1 1.2 2.2 1.3 1.7 
12. Member of a union or association 
(percent) 43 48 43 39 54 
13. Degree of formalization (percent): 
Pays federal taxes (RUC) 32 23 38 1 1 8 
Pays municipal fees 63 72 67 59 39 
Pays union dues 37 41 31 19 27 
14. Monthly sales:d 
Average for all clients 2,720 1,059 2,252 787 n.a. 
Median for all clients 1,735 646 1,240 419 n.a. 
Average for women clients 2,251 1,046 2,159 671 n.a. 
Median for women clients 1,363 634 1,114 332 n.a. 
Average for men clients 3,506 1,098 2,325 850 n.a. 
Median for men clients 2,393 820 1,323 514 n.a. 
15. Monthly sales, by gender and 
occupation:d 
Women clients: 
Manufacturing or agriculture 1,712 645 1,781 324 n.a. 
Trade 2,560 1,193 2,600 885 n.a. 
Services 1,027 799 1,083 n.a. n.a. 
Men clients: 
Manufacturing or agriculture 2,816 1,306 2,538 564 n.a. 
Trade 6,302 1,173 3,644 1,071 n.a. 
Services 2,532 760 771 939 n.a. 
(Cont.) 
Table 5. Bolivia: Client Occupation and Microenterprise Characteristics in the 
Sample, 1995. (cont.) 
Andes Banco Sol FIE PRODEM Sartawi 
16. Monthly sales of women clients u 
(percent): 
Less than 200 0 2! 0 38 n.a. 
200 to less than 500 15 21 12 24 n.a. 
500 to less than 1,000 21 3 i 27 19 n.a. 
l ,000 to less than 2,000 28 16 22 14 n.a. 
2,000 and over 36 l 1 39 5 n.a. 
17. Monthly sales of men clients J (percent): 
Less than 200 0 1 1 6 23 n.a. 
200 to less than 500 5 ')" _.) 21 26 n.a. 
500 to less than 1,000 12 26 13 
,.,,., 
_.) n.a. 
1,000 to less than 2,000 26 ')'"' ~.) 35 18 n.a. 
2,000 and over 58 17 25 10 n.a. 
18. Monthly sales of women clients d 
(cumulative; percent): 
Less than 200 0 21 0 38 n a. 
200 to less than 500 15 42 12 62 n.a. 
500 to less than l ,000 36 73 39 81 n.a. 
l ,000 to less than 2,000 64 89 61 95 n.a. 
2,000 and over 100 100 100 100 n.a. 
19. Monthly sales of men clients ct 
(cumulative; percent): 
Less than 200 0 11 6 23 n.a. 
200 to less than 500 5 34 27 49 n.a. 
500 to less than 1,000 16 60 40 72 n.a. 
1,000 to less than 2,000 42 83 75 90 n.a. 
2,000 and over 100 100 100 100 n.a. 
n.a. not available 
a Less than one percent. 
b Averages for those clients who actually hired permanent or temporary workers or who employed 
relatives in the enterprise only. 
c Average for the whole sample of clients. Some clients had no workers employed. 
d Figures in bolivianos converted into US dollars at the exchange rate as ofDecember 1995. 
Table 6. Bolivia: Characteristics of Microfinance Loans in the Sample, 1995. 
Feature Andes BancoSol FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
l. Size of most recent loan:" 
Average 1,053 602 1 'Y).1 
.. ~--. 30! 228 
Median 525 350 572 /'1~ __ .;, 215 
2. Size of loans received during 1995:" 
Average 734 ~60 807 266 202 
Median 364 260 429 215 175 
3. Size of all loans received:' 
Average 757 477 981 262 194 
Median 395 286 537 2!6 !80 
4. Variability of most recent loan:' 
Standard deviation 2,090 657 1,745 !88 138 
Coefficient of variation 1.98 1.04 1.43 0.62 0.61 
Ratio of standard deviation to median 3.98 1.88 3.05 0.85 0.64 
5. Size of most recent loan' (percent): 
Less than !50 15 14 4 18 14 
150 to less than 250 12 20 9 35 60 
250 to less than 500 23 29 25 35 22 
500 to less than 750 14 13 13 9 0 
750 to less than I ,000 10 6 12 0 2 
1,000 to less than 2,000 15 13 18 3 
2,000 and over 12 5 19 0 0 
6. Size of most recent loan• (cumulative; 
percent): 
Less than 150 15 14 4 18 14 
150 to less than 250 27 34 14 53 74 
250 to less than 500 49 63 39 88 96 
500 to less than 750 63 76 52 97 96 
750 to less than 1,000 73 82 63 97 99 
1,000 to less than 2,000 88 95 81 100 100 
2,000 and over 100 100 100 100 100 
7. Size of initial loan• (percent): 
Less than 150 41 78 22 54 88 
150 to less than 250 21 15 8 41 10 
250 to less than 500 21 4 28 
.., 2 .) 
500 to less than 750 7 2 17 1 0 
750 to less than 1,000 1 0 5 0 0 
1,000 to less than 2,000 6 0 15 1 0 
2,000 and over 2 0 5 0 0 
8. Size of initial loan• (cumulative; percent): 
Less than 150 41 78 22 54 88 
150 to less than 250 62 93 30 85 98 
250 to less than 500 83 97 57 97 100 
500 to less than 7 50 91 99 75 99 100 
750 to less than 1,000 92 100 80 99 100 
1,000 to less than 2,000 98 100 95 100 100 
2,000 and over 100 100 100 100 100 
(Cont.) 
Table 6. Bolivia: Characteristics of Microfinance Loans in the Sample, 1995. (Cont.) 
Feature Andes Banco So! FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
9. Credit deepening ratio (percent):b 
Average for all clients 43 166 91 98 n.a. 
Median for all clients 32 63 59 56 n.a. 
Average for women 45 180 6! 95 n.a. 
Median for women 44 60 45 97 n.a . .).) 
Average for men 38 118 !15 100 n.a. 
Median for men 4'") .)_ 67 91 50 n.a . 
10. Credit deepening ratio (percent):0 
Less than 20 29 !6 14 18 n.a. 
20 to less than 40 39 !5 18 ?4 -J n.a. 
40 to less than 60 II 17 18 13 n.a 
60 to less than 80 10 8 8 7 n.a. 
80 to less than l 00 5 8 12 2 n.a. 
I 00 to less than 200 5 20 20 15 n.a. 
200 and over I 15 10 22 n.a. 
II. Credit deepening ratio (cumulative; percent):b 
Less than 20 29 16 14 18 n.a. 
20 to less than 40 68 31 
..,,., 
.:l- 42 n.a . 
40 to less than 60 79 49 51 55 n.a. 
60 to less than 80 89 57 58 62 n.a. 
80 to less than 100 94 64 70 63 n.a. 
1 00 to less than 200 99 85 90 78 n.a. 
200 and over 100 100 100 !00 n.a. 
12. Lending technology (percent): 
Individual loans 100 n.a. 92 n.a. 18 
Group credit n.a. 100 3 100 82 
Associations n.a. n.a. 5 n.a. n.a. 
13. Average size of group (number of members) n.a. 4 5 4 3 
14. Frequency of payment (percent): 
Weekly 43 24 24 0 0 
Bi-weekly 48 28 II 3 0 
Monthly 10 48 64 97 100 
15. The loan was requested for (percent): 
Trade 55 63 39 61 64 
Production (manufacturing) 35 ?" -.:J 55 13 7 
Services 9 14 5 8 0 
Agriculture 0 0 0 4 14 
Livestock 1 0 0 4 10 
Other 0 -c 10 3 
16. Arrears (average number of days): 
Maximum for previous loans 8 2 10 3 6 
Maximum for present loan 4 5 3 3 
Total for present loan 6 8 3 4 
(Cont.) 
Table 6. Bolivia: Characteristics of l\Iicrofinance Loans in the Sample, 1995. (Cont.) 
Feature Andes BancoSol FIE PRODE\-f Sartawi 
17. Type of guarantee (percent):ct 
None 0 0 2 0 0 
Personal (cosigner) 46 2 55 33 3 
Lien on consumer durables 9l 24 0 2 
Lien on car 1 0 2 0 2 
Copy of title 9 1 !6 I 0 
Original title 8 l !8 0 44 
Unregistered mortgage 8 0 0 0 0 
Registered mortgage 0 3 0 0 
Lien on livestock l 3 0 5 
Joint liability group n.a. 97 5 99 81 
Phone cooperative shares 4 4 0 
Other -! 0 7 0 2 
18. Combinations of guarantees (percent): 
0. None 0 0 2 0 0 
i. Personal (cosigner) 0 29 0 
2. Lien on consumer durable 38 0 5 0 0 
3. Lien on car 0 0 1 0 2 
4. Copy of title 0 0 9 0 0 
5. Original title I 0 It 0 9 
6. Unregistered mortgage 0 0 0 0 0 
7. Registered mortgage 0 3 0 0 
8. Lien on livestock 0 0 0 0 
9. Joint liability group n.a. 95 3 66 44 
10. Phone cooperative shares 0 l 3 l 0 
11. Other 0 0 2 0 2 
!2: 1+2 29 0 t 1 0 0 
]3: 1+2+4 3 0 3 0 0 
14 =2+4 5 0 2 0 0 
15= 1+9 0 2 0 33 0 
16=1+4 0 3 1 0 
17=2+4+5 -a 0 0 0 
!8=1+2+5 ~ 0 1 0 0 
" 19=2+6 4 0 0 0 0 
20=1+2+6 4 0 0 0 0 
21:1+3+5 l 0 0 0 
22=2+10 4 0 0 0 
23=1+10 l 0 1 0 0 
24=1+11 0 0 4 0 0 
25=5+11 0 0 0 0 
26=1+5 2 0 3 0 0 
27=2+5 0 -a 2 0 0 
28=8+9 0 0 3 0 
~ 
.) 
29=1+2+8 1 0 0 0 2 
30=4+9 0 -a 0 0 0 
31=5+9 0 0 0 0 35 
n.a. Not applicable 
a Values in December, 1995 US dollars. 
b Ratio of current loan to value of sales x 100. 
c Less than one percent. 
d Number of observations of each guarantee type, either singly or in combination with other guarantees. 
Table 7. Bolivia: Financial Activities of the Clients in the Sam pie, 1995. 
Item Andes Ban coSo! FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
1. Financial assets held (percent): 
Checking account 6 10 4 0 0 
Credit card 2 5 3 0 1 
Bank savings account !3 37 10 4 
Deposits in savings and loan association 9 5 7 2 
Deposits in cooperative 4 3 " 0 4 J 
Pasanakus (ROSCAs) 20 "'') J~ 22 18 8 
Women 28 39 29 ~-_) 18 
Men 8 l 1 17 14 5 
2. Reserves for emergencies (percent): 
Cash in residence 53 43 42 69 62 
Livestock l 2 l 49 40 
Jewelry 6 4 2 0 0 
Deposits in a financial institution 15 43 12 2 
Lending with interest 2 a 1 "' 0 - J 
Loans to relatives 2 2 .... "' 1 j .) 
Pasanakus (ROSCAs) 18 .... ,.., _,_ 22 16 8 
.... Main form of savings (percent): .). 
Cash in residence 46 31 39 37 45 
Livestock 1 0 30 36 
Inventories and other goods 31 22 35 25 9 
Jewelry 1 2 1 0 0 
Deposits 12 26 13 1 1 
Lending with interest 1 0 1 1 0 
Loans to relatives 0 0 1 3 1 
Pasanakus (ROSCAs) 8 18 9 3 8 
4. Preferred currency of those with savings 
(percent): 
Bolivianos 38 30 26 51 56 
US dollars 62 70 74 49 44 
5. If given a chance to save, preferred 
currency (percent): 
Bolivianos 41 39 28 52 60 
US dollars 59 61 72 48 40 
6. If organizations offered deposit facilities, 
would use them (percent): 
Yes 73 75 68 73 74 
No 20 17 21 15 19 
Does not know 7 8 11 11 7 
(Cont.) 
Table 7. Bolivia: Financial Activities of the Clients in the Sample, 1995. (cont.) 
Andes BancoSo! FIE PRODE::Vl S:1mm i 
7. At about the time of the first loan with 
this organization, it had loans from 
(percent): 
Banksb 0.8 2.1 1.! 0.0 1.2 
Cooperatives 0.0 2.1 "'") :; __ 0.0 2.3 
Savings and loan associations 0.0 1.7 l.l 0.0 0.0 
PROCREDITO (Andes) n.a. 0.8 4.2 0.0 1.2 
Ban coSo! 17.2 n.a. 7.4 2.7 0.0 
FIE 4.7 1.3 n.a. 0.0 0.0 
PROD EM 3.1 1.7 4.2 n.a. 0.0 
Sartawi 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 n.a. 
OtherNGOs 7.7 4.0 4.8 19.2 18.2 
Moneylenders 7.8 10.0 10.5 5.4 3.5 
Relatives 26.6 29.7 22.1 52.7 53.5 
Friends 8.6 8.8 3.2 33.8 22.1 
Pasanakus 18.0 35.2 27.4 12.2 8.1 
8. During 1995 the client also had loans 
from (percent): 
Banksb 0.0 0.4 3.2 0.0 0.0 
Cooperatives 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.4 1.2 
Savings and loan associations 1.6 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.2 
Caja Los Andes n.a. 4.7 1.1 0.0 0.0 
BancoSol 9.4 n.a. 2.1 0.0 2.1 
FIE 2.3 1.7 n.a. 0.0 1.2 
PROD EM 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a. 1.2 
Sartawi 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 n.a. 
OtherNGOs 1.6 0.9 1.2 8.1 1.2 
Moneylenders 2.3 1.3 5.3 2.7 1.2 
Relatives 14.9 13.4 14.7 37.8 34.9 
Friends 2.3 7.5 4.2 16.2 7.0 
Pasanakus 10.2 22.2 13.7 13.5 0.0 
n.a. Not applicable 
a Less than 1 percent. 
b Does not include BancoSol. 
Table 8. Bolivia: Proximity to Banks and Microfinance Organizations, 1995. 
Andes Banco Sol FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
l. Client knows a bank close to (percent): 
business 39 31 45 1 1 7 
residence 13 13 29 14 6 
2. Mode of travel to the microfinance 
organization (percent): 
On foot 31 41 42 34 14 
Public transportation 69 59 55 62 83 
Other 0 3 4 
,., 
.) 
3. What microfinance organization is 
close to the business (percent): 
Caja Los Andes 55 12 '?" ~.) 0 0 
Banco Sol 48 58 51 3 
FIE 23 10 46 
PROD EM 4 5 5 55 9 
Sartawi 2 -• 4 19 38 
4. What microfinance organization is 
close to the residence (percent): 
Caja Los Andes 27 5 13 
BancoSol 29 27 28 2 
FIE 13 4 27 
PROD EM 2 46 7 
Sartawi 0 0 2 19 24 
a Less than 1 percent. 
Table 9. Bolivia: Attitudes of Micro finance Clients in the Sample, 1995. 
Andes BancoSol FIE PROD EM Sartawi 
1. How the client knew about the 
program (percent): 
Through a loan officer 11 5 8 11 13 
From friends and relatives, other 78 92 79 85 78 
clients 
Written ads 9 3 4 1 3 
Radio or t.v. 1 4 3 0 2 
Posters 8 2 7 6 
None of the three media above 80 92 88 92 88 
Other 2 0 2 0 0 
2. Clients are attracted because (percent): 
Can borrow more 47 48 44 86 50 
Terms to maturity are longer 24 13 31 4 16 
Interest rate is lower 36 28 56 15 38 
Can obtain individual rather than 
group loans 59 0 38 0 8 
Can obtain group rather than 
individual loans 0 39 0 11 17 
Less red tape 30 33 32 31 38 
Timeliness of loan 24 15 15 4 14 
Proximity 18 13 13 9 13 
Simple guarantee requirements 49 65 32 49 53 
Training courses 2 5 24 0 0 
Assistance with marketing 10 6 9 1 3 
3. Clients are generally satisfied with 
(percent): 
General relationship 85 91 81 99 94 
Guarantee requirements 88 94 79 97 91 
Loan size 34 54 48 53 31 
Term to maturity 66 69 71 72 69 
Interest rate 74 55 75 61 50 
